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IN THE SUPPEtI COUPT 
ST!'-TE OF UT.~Ji 
GE:~EFIE",~E A. Sf.~ITE, ~ESS:C Z .. SEITP., 
EETE ;.J. S1'1ITE, anc1 SALLI SMITH GIPAFD, 
vs. 
Involuntarv Defendants, 
PlaintifL, Respondent, 
and Cross Appellant, 
Case No. 17662 
Cf.;>..PLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHEPINE F. 
;:FPLEBY' oat: EJl\_F.NSON' and GRACE 
s:;AFrlSCF, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross Respondents. 
REPLY PP.IEF 
POI:NT I 
'I'HE TRIAL COURT'S FillDING THl\.T THE LESSORS 
WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO FOP.FF:ITURE BY ACCEPT-
l\.NCE OF RENT IS IN HAFMONY WITH UTAH LAW AND 
SHOULD BE UPHELD BY THIS COURT. 
The Respcndent admits that in the 32 months between 
filing the cc!'1plaint and trial, the Lessors received monthly 
payrr.ents in e}:cess of $22, 000 from the Lessees. (FB at 23) . 
);e'.'ertheless, the Respondent asks this Court, on cross appeal, 
to rule that the trial court erred in ruling that the Respon-
deDt wa.ived forfeiture of the lease by acceptance of rent. (P.B 
The Appellants believe that the trial court's finding 
cf waiver is correct and must be sustained by this Court. 
The finding challenaed by the Pespondent re0.ds as 
follcws: 
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r:;-:e ::te:-:t ~\/O i.= .;1;.es c.:ce ·«:-:Et:-.er t:--,:_s Lreacb. ~.-..'c:..:., ~u.::::­
stanti2l er.cuqh to ~uf'ti~~· .:=c:::-::=:e1 L:..r.0 tht-:: le,~:::~, -inG 
v1.bether t~1e tcrfeit:Jrs- h"2S «1ai",/ed b~ acc2·~t3!~cc: "i 
rent. ~he Ccurt fin~s fer tte defend2rts r~ t~t~ c~ 
the::e ::....s'.3UES. 
n fin~i~a ~t~t t~2 ~cce?t3~ce ~f ~en~ b'! ~~: o~ -te 
esscr5 ~;aiveci the jreach cf i~s~rar.ce ccver~rt, ~~e 
cllcwing ~actors were considered: 
(A) There was no stipulation that payments 
would be accectec net as rent, ~ut as future 
C.cuT~c.ges fer \~·i tt--~holCinq possessicn. .J9 .~. Jur. 
2C. :i.032. 
IE\ ~~e ~a~or~t:1 cf ~he less0rs 2P?~2~ ~c 
have accepted rent, as rent. Althcuah Lrs. 
c:~~ger inte~ded to accept it as dama0e~, ~hi~ 
••
1 2:: c.r:;-c,:::-entl~· r.ot. ccrrmu!'.ic2ted i:.o lessees. 
Finc.:.n.c ::c. ~ 3t F 304-305. 
T':le trial court's firC.ing that the 2.essors 1 accept-
ance 0£ re~~ waived their c!~im of forfe:_tu~e represen~s a wel~ 
established general rule in the State of Utah. Fer ::;xcirple, ir. 
l~oodland Theatres, Inc., v. AEC Interrr.cuntain The2,tres, Inc., 
560 P.2d 700 (C'tah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
acceptance cf rent waived the lessor's forfeiture of the lea2e-
hold, citing favorably an 1896 case as follows: 
This contested principle was re!Oolved lcna aao J_n 
Erigharn Younc Trust Ccmpany ~.? ~·:aaerier, ~13 Ctah 23G, 
44 P. 1030 (18%)]. This ccuri:c there e;:plainec' a 
party cannot be allowed tc avoid the ccntract, 2r.c 
then treat it as sub~isting, er treat it C'= suh-
eistina and afterwards be permitted to avo1u it i:cc 
the other party's injury. This ccurt held: 
. ~here hy reason of a breach cf a condition, a 
lease beccr.es :!:orfeiteC, the lesf:cr ., c- er.ti~::..~c tc. 
reccver pcs=:ession. Be wc:l;es -t~c.t ~ict"1t b 0 -:-:1~ 
acceptarce o:: re!"lt. He 
at -!:he saMe tirne clai~ 
560 P.2c 2.t 701. 
cari~ot_ c.ccept the .cer.t, rl'ci 
2 £c-rfei.t 1~-:.re of the 122.::·f'. 
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;:·i.rilcrl·:, in ~ensen v. ('.i~. In';estr;.ent Corscration, 
:0 L'tah 2c 50 7 P.2d I 1973) , plaintiffs, cwners cf a 
ca reel ol rec..l prcpert~/, e:~ecuted a J ec.se 2qr2ement. 
provided that lessees could not assign the lease without 
'.\"ritter-. apprcval of >::hE: ~essors. Several years late~ les2crs 
attempted tc forfeit the lease fer breach of this covenant. In 
response to the attempted forfeiture, this Court said: 
The conduct of olaintiffs over the period of ''ears in 
'"'hicf'. [the c..:::~ic;nee] remc.in-ed in pos~es2ion, 
particu:arly after they received written notification 
that the option tc renew was beinq exercised and thev 
acceoted the increased ren-+:al oa,fment, constituteca 
wci','er ci their riqht tc C.em2.r:.d a :crreiture fer 
breach o:: the ccndition agc..in2t assi~~roent t·lithout 
writter. consent. 507 P.2c at 717 (emphasis added). 
See also, ~iinshew v. Chevron Oil Comoar.•1, 575 P.2d 192 (Uta.h 
19 7 g) • 
In spite cf the trial court 1 s finding of fact that 
the lessors accepted rent, and the general rule that the right 
of forfeiture is waived by acceptance of rent, Respondent asks 
this Court to find error in the lower court's ruling because, 
"[I]t cannot be doubted that the pa~ties, through their 
2ttorneys, treated the rent either as compensation for with-
holcing possession er as compensation on a quantum meruit 
basis. 1' (RE 2.t 24) Succir.ctly stated, Respondent uraes that 
the trial court erred because she alleges the lessors intended 
that lessees' rental payments would not be accepted as rent and 
~he ~esires this Court to reverse a findi~g of fact pertaining 
~c, the lessors' eccept2r.ce cf rent entered by the trial court. 
AE evider.ce of her elleced intent Bespondent cites a paragraph 
-3-
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lessors unilaterally stated the icllcw~na: 
~o wai·.,-er or this notice or the rP.qt:ired t::.:1-t·- 1~,;1 
C.eys to rt:re the ?.bo1,:e-rrer.ti.cr.eG (ie±:cults ~"j 2..2 ~>~ 
grar.ted unless ~n ''Jri i:ing an::3 signed :JV 2.ll i:arties 
concer~ec. (ES at 22) 
The Appellants urqe this Ccurt t~ re=cct tbe Pe~po~de~t 1 2 
pcsiticn fer the rea£ons explaine~ in ~he tollowi~g ana~·.-~:~: 
A. ~·ihere !Jo Transcrint o:: tl:e ~~ia.~ PrcceeCi:-:c~ ~s 
Furrishec'., the Trio] Cour~'s Fi.!l(i::c;s of Fae"':. ~:u:::~ =-
Presur:'ed ~c Ee Correct. 
In Howard v. Howa:cd, 601 P.::d 931 IC:tah 19~9), this 
Cou::-:: heJ.C th2t \vhere r..o t::-ansc~ipt of trial proceeCing~ J.:: 
furnisteC, ~I'.e trial court 1 s i-u:ir_g cri the e"'1ider.ce mus"':. be 
presumed correct. See e.l so, P20nall v. Suburhia Lar:c Ccr,panv, 
579 P.::c ~17 IUtah 1978\; Sawvers v. Sawvers, 5~2 P.2ci 60~ 
(Utah 1916); K & P Plur:'bina & Eeatina, Inc., v. \•iintertcn, SC 
P.::d 1352 (Utah 1915). 
In the instant case the Respondent consciously chcsr 
tc proceed without the benefit of a transcript as tc the points 
raised on cress appeal. (P 358) A2 a result, and as a r:~atte! 
of factual accuracy, Respondent's brief is indeed "loaded with 
unreferenced self-servinq state~ents of facts and cc~tenticns 11 
with the apparent invitation that this Court reverse the lower 
court's findings cf fact that the lessors accepted rer_t a::: 
rent. See, Eaanall v. Suburbia Land Companv, 542 P. 2d 18:0, 13 11 
~te Respondent's unsup?ort~ble st2~e~cn~ ~h3( 
rental monies were receiveC. els either 11 ccr:tpensc.ticr_ ~er \-,dtJ-i-
holding pcssession er as co~pe~sation en 2 ~uanturn ~2ru1r 
bc.si:= 11 is tot.allv u:-i.referer:ced to the ~ecorC. anO ccrtraclicf-:~ 
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<:r:e lcr,-.·er ccurt' .s f ir.Uinc; that the ~2-~:rr.eEts we~e 2.ccepteC. as 
Ler.ts. (P.E at 24, cf. Finding Ne. - at E 304-305) 
The Ap~ellants reauested a partial transcript of the 
:_Jr-oceedir-.gs. The existence of this partial transcript in the 
~·-:ccrd does nc-1::, howe,1e::.-, defc=at ~hE presumption cf correctr.es.s 
cf the trial court's findings, even if the partial transcri?t 
t'"rcc'.ed tc suoport P.espcndent's arguments, which it c'.efinitel;• 
Coe~ r.ct. This Cour~, in Bacnall v. Suburbia Land Companv, 542 
?.:c' j_S: ('_'.tah 1975), decided 2 case in ""hich defendants reliec 
on a nartial reccrc, much of which appeared to be controvertec 
accordinc to the trial cour~'s findings. This resulted in many 
'-.1nre£erer.ceci statements of so-called facts in briefs. This 
C~urt said that where t~ere was cnl~ a ~artial record, it would 
oresu;ne the : ir.dir.gs of fact "to have beer, supported bv admis-
sible, competent and substantial evidence" and woulc "turn a 
deafened ear" to any criticism of the same. Id. at 184. 
It is instructive to note in the instant case that 
FesponC:ent's self-serving statements concernino pa~1ments 
received from the lessees are not even referencec to nor 
suppo:::-ted bv the partial transcript. The partial transcript 
dces, however, contain the following testimony given b:_r the 
?espondent which clearly supports the trial ccurt's finfing. 
Ci-.:.OSS EX11.l-iIFl~TION EY !IR. HUGHES: 
0uestio~: All riqht. 
the rent en time? 
Now, are you presentlv aetting 
f'l.nswer: Fer the 
cashiAr's checks, 
la st two months, £ ince I requested 
~1es, we have qotten it on ti~e. 
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(uesticn: And it is current, isr 1 t it? 
-~DS\1,rey: It is current, \·es. 
Question: Anc in fact, subsecuent to the filir.c ct 
tte suit and up until the o:::-esent t:i'.:'.e, vc-u''·e bsen 
receiving your rent, haven't :·ou, ilrs. Cl i_nger? 
Answer: er. :ime. sc~et~mes it's as riuch 
as a month late, Mr. C:uc;hes. 
Question: 
rent? 
But at any rate, vcu've been accepting the 
You bet. (PT at 63) 
The Appel lan.-cs conclude tr.at ~he court 1 5 
finding that the :Ces scr s, incl uc ing the P.e spcnden t, acceptec 
rent and thereby waivec their riaht of forfeiture r;;ust 0, 
presu!".ed ccr:.-ect en appeal withou-c a transcript of U'.e 
proceedings. 
B. The Responcent's Unilateral Reservation that 
.~.cceotance of Fent Would Not Constitute a \'ie.i,rer of 
Forfeiture Availed Respondent Nothing. 
The Respondent asserts that she did not intend that 
acceptance of rent should constitute a waiver of forfeiture an~ 
she invites this Court to find that thi:o: unilatera.l intent 
:o:hould bar waiver. This request comes in spite cf the fact 
that the trial court found as a matter of fact that all lessors 
waived forfeiture by acceptance cf rent. l·<hile the trial ccurt 
agreed that the Respondent mav have had the intent of acccptina 
the rent as carnages, it founc that this intent wa:o: never 
ccmmunicated to the lessees. (Findiria llo. F :?C4-305) 
!n ~ccdland 7heatr~s, =:r_c., v. AEC I:.ter~cur~~:.:r 
':'heatres, Inc., supre., this Court rejected a J.essor'5 atter-?t 
to escc,pe the rule th2t acceptar,ce of rent l,/cives fcrfeitsre, 
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~ct constitute a waiver of forfeiture. In that case this Court 
cuoted with approval ~he ~ollowinq admc~ition e~cpressed in 3A 
Thompson on Real Prooertv (1959 Replacement) Sec. 1328, p. 
:;:f the lesso:c receives rer.t from the lessee after 
:'ull notice arc knowlec:ge of a broken covenant or 
concition, he cannot thereafter assert his rights of 
:"•.rfeiture c;iven by the lease, notwithstandina 
exoress denial of the waiver upcn accentance of re~t. 
560 P. =c: 702 (empt2sis added). 
In spite cf the Respondent's unilateral atterr.ot to 
e:rnressl1 denv that monies accepted were rent, the viced land 
~heatres Court held that "the acceptance of rental pa~·ments, bv 
les:oor after the action was filed, precludes its right to 
en~orce fcrfeiture.'' Id. 
In the present controversv, Respo!ldent unilaterally 
declares that she intended to accept the money from the lessees 
2~ damages. The trial court held that she, as well as the 
ether lessors, accepted rent as rent and did rot communicate a 
ccntrar1 intent to the Appellants. (finding No. 7, R 304-305) 
Once again, the Appellants are constrained to state that this 
::irding cf fact may not be challenged on appeal vrithout the 
henefi t cf a complete tr2T'.script. Howard v. Eowa.rd, ~. 
This Cour~ should follow its preceC.ent in Headland Theatres and 
that the Respondent's unilateral declarations and 
crccmmunicated oral intentions may not ove:ccome the trial 
c·~u.r~' s fir.C.ir.g thc,t alJ the lessors continued to 2.ccept rent 
a~ter ~i!ing the law ~uit and thus waived their riqht of 
::orfeiture. 
-7-
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The 8espcnc:ient attel"cpts to buttress her "~~tent" 
argument by 8tatinq that the ~arc~ 19~8 "liotic<= to Cur~ 
Defaults" o-tates ar"::; qives notice "that acceptance of ::-,c,,t 
after the breach of a ccvenant will not be construec:i as consent 
to ~he breach or a ~a~ver cf the rich~ ~o assert a for~e~t~r~.'1 
In short, she asserts that unilateral notice of ~Er 
intent will bar waiver. 
The cl2use (hereinafter anti-waiver c::._c_use), ·.vhi·:~. 
assertedly ai~.-es this ex?ress notice, pr2\·icusl~· re~erenc2C 
~at 3, reaGs cs fcllcw8: 
rTo ·"'1ai?er cf this notice or the ~i:.::auireC thir"':~t ( .:30) 
C.avs t<: ci..::.::-e t~.e abcve-men"':.ioned - defaults 1...rlll be 
granted unless in writing anc:i signed bv all the 
parties concerned. (Emphasis a deed) 
The foregoing clause is not a blanket prohibition of 
waiver. It expressly denies only waiver of the notice of cure 
er the requirement that cure be made in thirt~, days after 
notice is given. The notice and perioc of cure a:ce C•n~'.' 
prerequisites to exercise of the right to forfeiture. E ir::ply 
stated, the effect of this clause is that in the absence of a 
written agreement to the contrary, the right to forfeiture 
would arise in thirt~ days. 'I'he 2rnti-wai•1er clause cannot 
reasonably be understood to pertain to waiver of the riaht of 
forfeiture, which arises only after the thirty-day perioc has 
run without written agreement to waive. Th:_" clause coes not 
~e~tion waiver cf t!"'.e rirrht c:: 
acceptance cf rent. 
It is a generally acceptec principle cf l2w tl1at 
forfeitures of leases 2re lcokeC upcn with c1 i ~ f a,;or and tr,2t 
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:::cr:':ei ture clauses 1:i 11 be ~~rictlv co~strDe~. Beck v. 
GiorC:ono, 356 P.2c 264 !Colo. '-960); _W_c_c_c_'_a_::._l ___ P_h_a_r_r, 162 
~.£.~r.<' 645 (Ga. 1969). The anti-w2i~er clause as corstrued b~ 
tl:e Re;opondent is a forfeiture clc.use. As explaineo above, 
:.:--:.2-~ clause is at best ambigl~cus. ~here fore, the ..;ppellants 
;,;os"r-: that it should be :=trictly cor.struec anc all arrbiguities 
resolved in ~aver o~ the lessees and against the harshness cf 
:c::-:e:..ture. 
The ?espcncer.t ci ':es Karbelr.ic:r 'J. Erothue!.l, 244 
'.:al.App.=a 333, 53 Cal.Pptr. 335 (1966) :or tte preposition 
~h2t ''notice 11 that acceptance cf re~t wil~ ~ot be construed as 
a waiver is enough to bar waiver. (PB at 2 4) 'I'he Karbelnia 
:ase Gees ~o~ sta~d for thi~ broad prcpcsitio~. In that case 
a~. ir.ter:nediate C2li::'orr_ia co'..l::: .. c helc th<,t a lessor's accep-
tar.ce of rent did not waive the lessc·r' s seeking forfeiture 
where the lessees had voluntarily ar.d expressly signed an 
acreement in the orioinal lease against wc.iver of the lessor's 
right to forf<C:iture bv acceptance ot rent in the event of 
breach. Tl"le t:arbelnic Court founc thi:o agreer.cent signed bv tl:e 
::..es sees bound them 2.r~C- ~heir c.ss2._gnes a.r..C \·.'as 11 tantarrcunt to a 
~e:i~cuis~me~t of the right of lessees and their assiqnees to 
esse~t a waive= . SJ Cal.P.ptr. 2.t J<;l (emphasis added). 
As make-weight ~acts, the Karbelnia ccur~ referred ~o 
t::2 le£sor 1 s notice +::-i.at -::he acceptance cf re::.t would nci: ::e 
~c~.:ot::::'.iec 2.s a '.·:c.1ye::: a:--.d hc.c ac::ec pror:-cptl~.' in fili;-.c its 
:?u?E c~ EC-f:ic~ wter<C:~n it soug~t :cr::'eitu:::e oi t~e lease. 53 
C::,:.E~tr. 2t ~41. 
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holding was based was the existence of an express agreement 1 r 
the lease that acceptance of rent would net be a waiver. 
Therefore, this case does not stand for the proposition that 1 
unilateral notice given to the lessees, that acceptance of rent 
would not waive the rigtt cf forfeiture, is enough to frustrate 
or bar the waiver doctrine. 
In the instant c:tse the anti-waiver clause i;i the 
"Notice to Cure Defaults" is the unilateral expression cf tr:e 
lessors, to which the les2ees did net agree. Even i: this 
Court cons-ccrues this clause to qive notice th2.t acceptance o: 
rent will no': wai·1e the right of forfeiture, contra.Pr to the 
plain language o:: the clause, that unilateral notice by itself 
will not bar waiver according to this Court's opinion ire 
Wooc.Jand Theatres, Inc., v. ABC Interrnountairi Theatres, Inc., 
~· wherein this Court said that "such a unilateral 
reservation avails lessor nothing." 560 P.2d at 701. 
POINT II 
THE TRIJl.L COURT'S RCLING THAT ALLEGED 
HEALTH AND BUILDING CODE VIOLATIONS AS 
WELL AS WASTE WERE l:lOT PROPERLY RAISED 
OR PLED IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE 
SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT. 
The Respondent argues that the trial court erred in 
finding that alleged breaches consisting of health and building 
code violations, as well as wc.ste, were not pled or raised. 
(RB at 17) Close excrnination of the record revec.ls that tr.e 
trial court's ruling is correct and should be sustained bv this 
Court. 
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~espondent's Verified Complaint was filed May 8, 
:978, <dmost three years before trial. The first cause of 
action alleges Appellants' failure tc maintain adequate l:ia-
bili ty insurance on the premises. The entire Verified Com-
plaint will be attached hereto so that the Court may review its 
thrust in totnlity. Paragraphs 14 through 23, omitted in 
Fespondent's Brief, are important as they individually and 
collectively focus on Appellants' alleged breach in "having 
:ailed to act in good faith to provide liability insurance 
coverage on the leased premises or to provide lessor-plaintiff 
with any policy ot insurance as provided in paragraphs 9 and 15 
of the lease agreement." (R 4, '][21) The only other matter 
ccmolained of was the Appellants' continuing possession despite 
this alleged breach. Id at ']['][27-28. This is the entire breach 
spoken of in the first cause of action. 
The second cause of action alleges that the nature of 
the premises is basically recreational and that the risk-
creating activity of the same poses risks to both persons and 
personal property. (See attachment to this brief) But again, 
the Respondent's only request for relief in the second cause of 
action was a temporary and permanent enjoinder of activities on 
the premises unless liability insurance was first obtained as 
called for by the lease. Nevertheless, the Respondent, on 
appeal, characterizes her Verified Complaint as clearly assert-
i~g issues other than insurance. (RB at 3) 
Eespondent seeks to cure this obvious lack of any 
pleading cf health or building cede violations in the Verified 
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Complaint by asserting tr.at the "l\otice to Cure Defaults," 
which was attached as an exhib!.t tc the complaint, is suf~ic-
ient to raise these issues. This argumer:t is ill-cor:cei'1ed. 
Responcient quotes Rule 10 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure wherein that rule states that exhibits are included as 
part of the pleadings "C:cr all purposes," and proposes that 
this exhibit of the Verified Complaint should be allowed to 
allege entire causes of action net set forth in the cor;iplarnt. 
(RB at 16) 
Tr.e Resoondent' s interpretation of Rule 10 (c) r2,s 
been rejectec ::.:-. ctr.er jurisdictions and ought tc be rejected 
by this Court. In Hoover Equipment Company v. Smith, 198 Kan. 
121, 422 P.2d 914 (1967), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that 
K.S.A. 60-210(c) which, similar tc lO(c) U.R.C.P., provided 
that exhibits attached to a complaint are part of the same "for 
all purposes," nonetheless, does not permit a substitution of 
such exhibit "for any allegation lacking in the pleading but 
necessary to declare a legal claim of relief against the 
defendant." Id., at 919, citing Caterpillar Tractor Companv v. 
International Harvester Companv, 106 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1939); 
1-A Barron & Hol tzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, §325 at 
page 260; 71 C.J.S. "Pleading", §375 (2); 41 Am • .:;-ur. "Pleading", 
§56. Similarly, other courts have continually ruled that while 
an exhibit may be considered as a part of a pleading to clari~~ 
and explain the same, an exhibit to a pleading ca~not serve the 
purpose of supplying necessary material averments, and the 
information recited in the exhibit to the pleading is not tc be 
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taken as alleged by the pleading itself. See, Burgess '' · 
cownino, 354 P.2d 293, 223 Or. 235 (1960); Ernolo•rers Casualtv 
C:ompanv v. Transport Insurance Cornpan•r, 440 S.W.2d 606 (Texas 
1969); Anderson v. Chambliss, 262 P.2d 298, 199 Or. 400 (1953); 
!'.r.dersen '"-· Turoin, 142 P.2d 999, 172 Or. 420 (1943); Wriqht v. 
White, 110 P.2d 948, 166 Or. 136 (1941). 
As succinctly stated in 71 C.J.S. "Pleading" 
§3/5 (a) (2): 
Generally an exhibit can be used only to clarify and 
remove uncertainty in pleadings, or to furnish parti-
culars, and not to supply allegations essential or 
material to a cause of acticn or defense. 
See also, Chesney v. Chesnev, 33 Utah 503, 94 Pac. 989 (1908), 
an older but unquestionably well reasoned Utah case. 
In light of the foregoing, Finding of Fact No. 4 
entered by the trial court which follows is correct and should 
be sustained: 
4. The notice of forfeiture sets forth various 
grounds for forfeiting the lessees' interest and 
although it was attached to the complaint, a claim 
for relief was stated only with respect to the matter 
of insurance. The motion to amend the complaint 
during the trial to include the non-insurance matters 
was objected to, along with the proffered evidence. 
This evidence was admitted provisionally, subject to 
the rulino of the motion to amend. The Court finds 
that the matter of other breaches was a significant 
change in the cause of action (which consumed most of 
the trial) , that it was not consented to be tried by 
the defendants and that no reason was adduced for not 
timely moving to amend prior to trial. Accordingly, 
the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 15 to 
deny the motion to amend. The objections to 
testimony and exhibits pertaining to breaches of the 
lease other than insurance are sustained. 
The Respondent further asserts that the Appellants 
were made aware of the health code and building cede defaults 
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claimed, by answers to interrogatories filed on November 13, 
1980, and supplemental answers filed January 28, 1981. I FE at 
12) On August 21, 1918, Appellants filed interrogatories in 
order to clarify Respondent's position as to certain violations 
of the Utah Code mentioned in the "Notice to Cure: Defaults," 
but which were not pleaded in the Verified Complaint. ( R 53) 
Answers to these interrogatories were not timely filed. 
Responding to the Appellants' motion to compel answers to 
ir.terrogatories (R 120), Respondent purportec to answer i:hese 
interrogatories or_ t1cvember 13, 1980. (R 122) These answers 
were insuf=icient. Appellants invite this Court tc examine 
Respondent's answers given on 0:ovember 13, 1980, to 
Interrogatory No. 2 9 rec;ardinc; inspection of the leased prem-
ises requested by the Plaintiff. 
answered as follows: 
Inspections were made and areas 
tionable are listed in detail 
later. (R 135) 
(F 134, 144) Respondent 
found to be objec-
and will be given 
The detailed list was not to be found. Furthermore, 
in answering Interrogatory No. 3 2, wherein Appellants asked 
Respondent to state wherein the Appellants were in violation of 
the Utah Division of Health, Code of Camp, Trc.iler, Court, 
Motel, Hotel, Resort Sanitation Regulations, the Respondent 
blithely answered that the Appellants should "see attached copy 
of report." (R 135) The only problem is that there was no 
ccpv of any report attached to the interrogatories! 
To further elucidate Respondent's unwillingr:ess to 
clarify her position, Appellants need do no more than ask the 
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court to examine her Answers to Interrogatories No. 33, 37, 42, 
43, 44, 45, 46 and 48. These requests all pertain to improving 
the leased premises for the benefit of the public. All Pespon-
dent's answers refer to the replies to either Interrogatory No. 
29 or 3 2 recited above, which responses we have already seen 
were really not responsive at all. (R 135-138) 
l!pon review of these answers, Appellants were con-
strained to renew their motion to compel and for sanctions. On 
the 9th day of December, 1980, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, 
sitting on the Law and Motion Calendar, gave Respondent's 
counsel seven days in which to complete discoverv and answer 
Interrogatory No. 29. (R 163) The actual answers were not 
filed unLil the very morning cf trial, January 29, 1981, some 
twc ar.d one half years after Appellants requested that the 
Respondent clarify her position! 
It is abundantly clear from the record that the 
reason Respondent did not respond to the interrogatories was 
because the Respondent was not aware of any specific defaults 
other than the alleged lack of liability insurance. The 
following testimony given by Respondent at trial, i:iore than two 
and one half years after filing of the the "Notice to Cure 
Defaults" is illuminating: 
CROSS EXAMINATIOH BY MR. HUGHES: 
Question: All right. Now, as of December 12, 1980, 
did vou know what the nature of the health code vio-
lati;ns were on the premise? 
Answer: As of that date? 
Question: Yes. 
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Answer: It seems to me that I did not receive a copy 
of the report until January. 
Question: 1981? 
Answer: 81. 
Question: .~.nd prior tc thC>.t tiIT.e did :.:cu '.<now what 
the nature of vicla~ions were? 
Answer: I did not know the exact codes, no, but I 
certainly felt as though it needed some help. 
Question: You had a feeling thC>.t there were 
obviously violations that needed fixing? 
Answer: Yes. I didn't know the exact code numbers. 
Question: O.K. But at that time when you executed 
Plaint:i.::fs' E::hibit 4, it was JUSt basicall~; the same 
genera2. :eeling that there were some violations out 
en tf:.e ?::-8Fer-t~ '? 
Answer: Bell, Mr. Boutwell filed this and he told us 
that there was no doubts codes were being brcken, but 
we were r.ot told what specific co0es. (PT 68-69) 
Subparagraph 4 of Respondent's answer to inter-
rogatory Mo. 29 tendered on the morning of trial is especially 
revealing: 
Inspections ;nade by Bob Simpson and David Fairhurst, 
county building inspector, have 1ust recently become 
available, and are attached hereto as Exhibits "A", 
"B", "C" and "D" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. (R 176, emphasis added) 
Perusal of the reports of the inspectors revea~s that 
inspections weren't even conducted until March of 1980 and some 
were as late as January 6, 1981, years after the filing of the 
complaint and notice of default. The Respondent alleges that 
the substance of these reports was communicated to the 
Appellants "shortly after the time of inspecticr." (PB at :ol, 
but there is no support for this contention, which once again 
is unreferenced to the record. 
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In light of the late dates of the inspections aDd the 
ignorance of the lessors themselves concerninq the nature of 
the supposed defaults, it seems incredible that the Respondent 
would seriously assert that the "Notice to Cure Defaults" put 
Appellants on notice of the de~aults claimed or that had Appel-
laDts spent "a few minutes making telephone calls to building 
inspectors instead of drafting interrogatories they would have 
quickly learned what defaults existed." (RB at 13) 
It should be noted that while Respondent puts much 
stress on the finding of the inspectors that the premises were 
"found unsafe and dangerous to human life" in 1980, two years 
after filing the complaint, she failed to indicate the premises 
were not closed by those same state and local health and build-
ing inspectors who made inspections on the premises. (RB at 4) 
Instead, once the inspection reports were made available to the 
Appellants on the morning of trial, steps to cure and actual 
cure of said violations were initiated to the satisfaction of 
such officers during the very period allowed for trial. 
Respondent also argues that the Appellants were not 
unfairly surprised and prejudiced by the issues regarding 
building and health code violations, since those issues were 
included in Appellants' own proposed pretrial order. (RB at 
14-17) This unsigned pretrial order of November 19, 1979, does 
indeed show that Appellants were aware Respondent might claim 
somethina dealing with violations of regulations promulgated by 
the Utah State Division of Health. This oossibilitv was com-
municated in the "Notice to Cure Defaults." However, it should 
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be carefully noted that as of Lhe date of this l,Jnsicmed pre-
trial order Appellants were sti 11 trying to clarify wbether 
Respondent ir:te!'ded that additional claims were to be liti-
gated, ana if so, the Appellants were trying to compel Pespon-
dent to reveal the nature of her claims by ans1,ering the 1'-.ppel-
lants' interrogatories. The paragraph entitled "Discovery" in 
the proposed yet unsigned pretrial order reveals the arr.biguity 
and confusion surrounding the Respondent's lawsuit. 
Discovery will be completed at least ten (10) days 
prier to trial. Interrogatories which are outstand-
ing shall be discussed between the parties so that 
those !"2.terial to the lawsuit er which may become 
material miahL be answered in due course. It is not 
clear at ::h.is tine whether the Plaintiffs intend to 
go forward pertaining to issues based on allegea 
violations of health code provisions. IR 91) 
The Respondent's unwillingness to clarify her claims 
raised questions as to whether she intended to pursue the same 
at trial. The validity and reasonabler.ess of the Appellants' 
doubts as to whether Respondent intended to pursue health code 
violations as a cause of action in the litigation is under-
scorea by the testimony of Mr. Boutwell, counsel for lessors at 
the time the "Notice to Cure Defaults" was filed, wherein Mr. 
Boutwell testified that three of the lessors did not intend to 
pursue the alleged heal th and building code violations. (PT 
12:9-20) Certainly if three of the lessors did not intend to 
pursue these alleged violations, the Appellants' uncertainty as 
to what was being litigaLed is reasonable. 
In summary, the Appellants ask this Court to uphold 
the trial court's finding that the breaches other than insur-
ance were significant changes in the cause of action which were 
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r.ot timely raised, pled or tried with consent. The Respon-
dent's attempts to overturn this finding once again have a 
hollow ring in view Respondent's unwillingness to clarify her 
claims prior to the day of trial and her subsequent failure to 
rely on a transcript when challenging the trial court's find-
ings on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COCRT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRET:::ON IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
'lO AMEND. 
The trial court found that "no reason was adduced for 
not timely moving to amend prior to trial," and accordingly 
exercised its discretion under Rule 15 to deny the Respondent's 
rr.otion to amend. (Finding No. 7, R 303-304) 
Respondent argues that the t:rial cou:::t abused its 
discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend. Respon-
dent's first point is that it was unreasonable for the trial 
court to deny the motion because Appellants were not unfairly 
surprised or prejudiced by the Respondent's claims. In this 
the Respondent overlooks the fact that the Appellants only 
became aware of the Respondent's claims on the morning of trial 
when Respondent finally submitted answers to interrogatories. 
(See Point II, supra) 
In spite of this obvious prejudice, Eespondent 
asserts that Appellants were not surprised because "continu-
2r.ces of the trial gave Defendants almost a full month to 
prepare to meet these issues." (RB at 18) Trial began on 
~anuary 29, 1981, and continued uninterrupted for two days. (R 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
186,195) l\uch of that time was consumed hearinq evidenr:e, 
which was provisionally adrr,itted over Appellants' obJection, 
concerning Respondent's recently revealed claims. (R 303! 
Certainly it cannot be qainsaid that Appellants were surprisec 
and prejudiced by this late prof:'er of evidence. 
court then conti!1ued the trial until Februar:_,· 20, 
The tria~ 
1981. IP 
195) During the interim the i'-.ppellants initiated cure of the 
alleged defaults. Not until February 20, 1981, did Respondent 
file her motion to amend. By this time, after three years cf 
preparation for trial and two days of actual trial, the damage 
and prejua::.ce to the Appellants had been done. The Appellants 
were prejudiced in their cefense on the merits, having only 
learned the particulars of the Respondent's claims on the 
morning of trial. (See U.R.C.P. Rule 15(b)) 
It is evident from the very efforts of discovery 
recited heretofore in Point II that even were Respondent's 
amendments otherwise allowable as nonprejudicial to the Appel-
lants, the Respondent's dilatory tactics in responding tc dis-
covery and failure to comply with not one but two discovery 
motions to compel would easily provide the trial court alter-
native grounds under Rule 37 (b) (2) (B) or (C) to have refused to 
entertain Respondent's motion to amend her complaint after the 
inception of trial. (See R 120-28; 158-60) 
Respondent correctly cites Gillman v. Hansen, 26 U.2d 
165, 486 P.2d 1G45 (1971) for the proposition th2.t ~he trial 
court's discretion in denying leave to amend "is to be exer-
cised in furtherance of justice." Id at 1046. This Court, in 
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First Securitv Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 
P.2d 859 (Utah 1979) states that in determining whether a 
denial of a motion to amend will promote justice, that judgment 
should be granted, "in accordance with the law and the evi-
der.ce." Id. at 861, emphasis added. In short, the trial 
court's discretionary ruling, which is not to be overruled 
unless there is an abuse of discretion (Benson v. Oreqon Short 
Line R. Co., 35 U. 241, 99 P. 1072 (1909) l, is based in part on 
its evaluation of evidence. The trial court found that the 
e•iidence did not merit amendment. The Respondent disagrees. 
Again, Respondent finds herself in the unenviable position of 
challenging the factual foundation for the trial court's dis-
cretionary decision without providing a transcript to properly 
enable this Court to review this factual determination. Thus, 
Respondent's allegation of an abuse of discretion should go 
unheeded according to the reasoning of this Court in Howard v. 
Howard,~· 
that: 
POINT IV 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD NOT 
ADEQUATELY RAISED HEALTH AND BUILDING 
CODE VIOLATIONS, OR IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO AHEND, THESE ERRORS WERE NEVERTHE-
LESS Hi°'_filJLESS ACCORDING TO RULE 61, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and nc error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any c= the parties, is ground for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
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court at every stage of the proceedings nust dis-
regard an~' error or defect in t'.le proceedino v•hich 
does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
This Court has cont2.nuall~' ~1e2.d tr..a~ t~e ~~1dic:i.ac· 
must disregard a~y errcr which does not a~fect t~e substantia: 
rights o:' the par+:ies, and no jucsment shall J:e re'iersed or 
affected by reason of such error er C.etect. This Court h2s 
f•.Jrther held that the burC.en is upon +:he partc' cleiming '=rror 
to show both e:cror aI'd prejudice before he may t:>revail. ;'his 
burden incluces a showing that there is at lea:;t a reason2ble 
likelihcod •:._'"'.2-: result would have teen differeni:: i:-: the 
abse~ce of t~e alleged error. See, State ''· Salmon, 612 P.~c. 
366 (Utah 1950) Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail~oad 
Ccmoanv, 3 U.2d 444, 286 P.2d 240 (1955); Burton v. Zior,s 
Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 249 P.2d 514 (Utah 1952); 
Startin v. 11adsen, 237 P.2d 834 (Utah 1951) 
The ~ relief Respondent seeks on her cross appeal 
is forfeiture of the lease. (RB at 20) Assum:.ng, argu~ndo, 
that the Respondent wer:e to otherwise bear her burden of 
establishiI'g error in the trial court's finding that additional 
defaults were net adequately r~ised, or in that ccurt 1 ~ ~enial 
of her motion to amend, the Respondent, !'onetheless, nay ~.ot 
prevail because she cannot show substantial prejudice in the 
denial of her ef::'orts to obtain a :orfeiture, or a r:easor.2bl2 
likelihood of a different judsment on -:.he 2.ssue of :o~feit'Cre 
hac the trial court ctherw:'_se entertc.ir.ed her: al'..ecrc.ticnc. 
J..ppellants re~oectfull•1 . - submit that this becc.1.1se t:~_e 
judgment o:: the trial court der~ving for::eit'--lre part2.~: or. t:e 
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basis of Respondent's waiver of that equitable right is both 
persuasive and pervasive as to any claimed breach. The trial 
court found that the majority of the lessors accepted "rent as 
rent" and waived any right to forfeiture. The trial court 
further found as a matter of fact that the Respondent, even 
thought she may not have intended to "accept rent as rent," did 
not communicate this unilateral reservation to the lessees and 
waived the right of forfeiture. This finding cannot now be 
:hallenged on appeal without a transcript. 
There is no reasonable likelihood that the finding of 
waiver of the right to forfeiture would have been different had 
the trial court allowed the Respondent to amend. This Court 
held in Woodland Theatres, Inc., v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, 
~· that acceptance of rent with knowledge of a breach after 
the action was filed precluded the right to enforce forfeiture. 
This Court's rationale was that acceptance of rent with full 
knowledge of a default is a reaffirmation of the lease and the 
continua.tion of the landlord-tenant relationship in spite of 
the default. The only limitation on this doctrine of waiver is 
that the breaches must be known before they can be waived. In 
the instant case, Respondent necessarily claims that the 
alleged defaults relating to violations of the health and 
building codes were known to the lessors when they filed their 
"Notice to Cure Defaults." In other words, these defaults were 
supposedly kr_own to the lessors when they accepted rents from 
the lessees. Since these defaults were supposedly known to the 
iessors when they accepted rent and affirmed the tenancy, there 
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is no justification in reason or in law to distinguish the 
unlitigated defaults from the litigated defaults or speculate 
that had the trial court litigated these additional defaults it 
would have come to a different conclusion as to the lessor's 
acceptance of rent being a waiver of the alleged breaches and a 
reinstatement of the lease. Simply stated, regardless of the 
nature of the defaults litigated between the parties, the 
lessors still accepted rent, and the trial court would still 
have been bound to follow the rule of Woodland Theat;::es and 
declare that the lessors' right to forfeiture had been waived. 
It should also be observed that the trial court pro-
visionally heard all of the Respondent's evidence regarding the 
alleged defaults. In fuct, hearing of the evidence en these 
defaults consumed most of the trial. (Finding No. 4, R 303) 
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the lessors accepted rent 
and waived forfeiture. In the Appellants' estimation, this is 
a strong indication that the trial court would not have come to 
a different conclusion on the issue of forfeiture had it 
allowed the Respondent to amend. Apparently there was nothing 
in this provisionally accepted evidence to convince the court 
that the lessors had not accepted rent or that the rule 
expressed in Woodland Theatres should not apply. 
Respondent has failed to shoulder her burden to shew 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that Finding of Fact No. 
;, in which the court found waiver of the right to forfeiture, 
would have been different had she been allowed to amend. IR 
304-305) The Appellants submit that the Respondent still would 
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::ot have been granted the relief of forfeiture, which is the 
only relief she seeks. Therefore, no substantial rights are 
affected, even if this Court finds error in the lower court's 
denial of Respondent's motion to amend, or otherwise rule on 
her allegations of health code violations. Clearly, any error 
in this case was harmless. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT AS A CO-TENANT CANNOT MAINTAIN 
AN ACTION FOR THE FORFEITURE OF A LEASE 
WHEN SHE IS NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION BY 
OTHER CO-TENANTS. 
Near the end of March, 1978, Genevieve A. Smith, 
::resse E. Smith, Beth M. Smith, and Salli Smith Girard (the 
Respondent, aka Salli Smith Clinger) as co-tenants signed a 
"llotice to Cure Defaults" and caused it to be served on the 
/-.ppellants. The notice sets forth an alleged default in main-
taining liability insurance on the premises, as well as other 
grievances, and notified the Appellants that legal action would 
be instituted to forfeit possession of the premises if the 
defaults were not cured in thirty days. 
On May 8, 1978, the above-named co-tenants jointly 
filed a Verified Complaint seeking to establish lessees' prior 
default ar_d forfeiture of the lease. Over the next 32 months 
':he lessors, as co-tenants, received monthly rental payments 
from the lessees which amounted to $22, 400. (RB at 23) The 
trial court found as a matter of fact that lessors had accepted 
rent as rent, and that any possible intent to the contrary on 
the part of the Respondent had not been communicated to the 
lessees. (R 305) 
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Ey a stipulation dated in December of 1980, the trial 
court signed an crder dismissing with pre'udice three of the 
co-tenants, Genevieve ' '"'· SJT1ith, Jesse Smith, and Beth ;.1. 
Smith. (R 164) In spite of the fact that Plaintiffs normall" 
have the right tc dismiss (l'.R.C.P. 41 (a) 12)), the trial court 
set aside the order dismissing three of the co-tenants and 
joined them as involuntarv parties defendant because the stipu-
lation to dismiss the +:tree co-tenants had net been subI".litted 
to the remaining co-tenant, the Respondent. (Finding no. 2, 
R 302) In short, three co-tenants were forced to p2rticipate 
invcluntari~: as defendants, even though they had expressed no 
desire to pursue the forfeiture. 
The general rule regarding forfeitures by co-tenants 
is stated in 50 A.L.R.2d 1366: 
It is established that where property subject to a 
lease is owned by co-tenants, forfeiture cf the lease 
on the ground of breach of covenants on the part of 
the lessee cannot be enforced bv less than all of 
such co-tenants. -
In Calvert v. Bradlev, 57 U.S. 580 (16 Hrn·1.) (1853), 
one of several co-tenant-lessors had entered into a lease of 
property called the National Hotel in Washington. The lessee 
covenanted to keep the premises in geed repair and surrender 
them in like repair. The Supreme Court held that this covenant 
ran to all lessors and that one of the lessors c.ctinc; c:Cone 
could not maintain an c.ction for the breach of it by the 
lessee. Disrr.issinc; the complaint, the Supreme Court s+:ateci 
that if the covenantees can sue ~ointly, "thev are bound to de 
SQ. II 
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In Fredekina v. Grimmett, 86 S.E.2d 554 (W.Va. 1955), 
a husband and wife owned some property under lease as tenants 
ir. CCTTllT'.On. The husband thereafter died, leaving two minor 
children, who at the time of trial each held an undivided one-
eighth interest in ccmmon, subject to the dower of the widow, 
who owned an undivided three-fourths interest. The widow 
continued to receive rents and had disqualified herself from 
seeking enforcement of the forfeiture clause. Such disqualifi-
cation of one of the co-tenants prevented a claim by her to 
forfeit the lease alleging standing as guardian of the two 
minor children. The court said: 
All the heirs of J. G. Fredeking, must concur and 
unite in the enforcement of the forfeiture provision 
for its breach of the lease; and there can be no 
forfeiture of the lease by less than all the tenants 
i.n cor:unon who own uncivided interests in the prop-
erty. Howard v. Mannina, 79 Okl. 165, 192 P. 358, 12 
A.L.R. 819 (1920). 
The court reasoned that less than all co-tenants 
could not pursue forfeiture because "if the lease could be 
forfeited by less than all the owners of the undivided 
interest, the lessee would be bound by the lease as to some of 
such owners and discharged as to other such owners. " 86 S.E.2d 
at 5 64. See also, Eurenav v. Equitable Realty Corporation, 341 
!10. 341, 107 S.\'l.2d 68 (1937). 
There is limited case law which suggests that one 
co-tenant may initiate a notice of foreclosure without other 
co-tene.nts, if such action would inure to the benefit of all 
lessors. For example, in Webb v. Graf, 289 Ky. 644, 159 S.W.2d 
433 (1942), the court upheld a notice of development filed by 
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only one co-tenant-lessor. In maintaining the suit, however, 
the Webb Court noted that all the lessors in common had joined 
in the action and affirmed and ratified the action of the 
single co-tenant who had filed. The court reaffirmed the 
language cf union Gas & Oil Cc. v. Gilliam, 212 Ky. 2S2, 279 
S.W. 629 11925), wherein it was stated that all the co-tenc.nts 
in common must concur and unite in an action to enforce a 
forfeiture. Thus, the limited holding in the Webb case is that 
a single co-tenant may initiate an action if such action inures 
to the ~enefit of all lessors and if all lessors later join and 
unite in the pursuance of the suit, pursuant to the standards 
set forth in the Gilliam case. 
The instant case is readily distinguishable. All 
lessors temporarily joined together to initiate the forfeiture 
action. See, Axis Petroleum Co. v. Tavlor, 108 P.2d 978 
(Cal.App. 1941); B. & B. Sulphur Co. v. Kellev, 141 P.2d 908 
(Cal.App. 1943). Later all lessors, according to the trial 
court's finding, accepted rent from the lessees, but ne11er 
again acted harmoniously. After it became obvious that the 
lessees had cured the insurance default (prior to the filing of 
the complaint) and the lessors had accepted over $22,000 in 
rent, three of the four lessors decided that their best 
interests were to withdraw from the law suit. 
majority of the lessors did not loin in or unite in prosecuting 
this suit after the initial filing. Neither can it be said 
that F.espondent' s pursuing forfeiture >1ould somehow inure to 
the benefit of her cc-lessors, as they had already determined 
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that it would be to their benefit to reinstate and continue the 
~· In addition, it is difficult tc conceive how pursuing 
fcrfei "'c:.ure could inure to the lessors' benefit when they had 
a.lready waived and precluded any possibility of forfeiture by 
acceptance or rent. For these reasons the Appellants believe 
tha.t this Court should follow the general rule and hold that 
because the lessors were not united in their desires to pursue 
forfeiture, as evidenced by their acceptance of rent and 
attempted dismissal of the suit, the Respondent, acting alone, 
may not maintain this claim. 
POINT VI 
THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO HEET HER BURDEN 
OF PROOF ON TEE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S rEES 
WHE:N SHE CHOSE TO RELY ON CCNTF.OVERTED 
AND H:ADEQUATE fl.FFICAVITS. 
In response to the arguments mace in the Appellants' 
Brief ~hat the trial ccurt erred as a matter of law in awarding 
the Respondent attorney's fees, the Respondent makes several 
points which should be addressed in this reply. There is no 
dispute in this case that an award of attorney's fees must be 
based on findings of fact, which in turn must be based on the 
evidence. The primar~ dispute in this case concerns the kinds 
of evidence that may provide an evidentiary basis for the award 
'·1hen both the amount ar.d the availabilit'.' cf the award is con-
troverted, as distinguished from an uncontroverted award. The 
~ppellants ~ave urged that the trial court erred in awarding a 
ccntroverted attorney's fees to the Fespcndent on the basis of 
rsbutted af~idavits alo~e, withcut swor~ testino~y. Respondent 
, '.0 e rt s that the trial coi.:rt' s award of a ttor'.'ley' s fees or. 
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controverted affidavits instead of upon sworD testimony is 
proper because the Appellants were given an opportt.:ni ty for 3 
hearing on the matter, but that opportunity was "waived" by the 
Appellants. (RB at 6) 
The general rule is that attorney's fees are reauired 
to be proved by sworn testimony. Aiken Burrcuchs, 30 c. 2C: 
116, 514 P.2d 533 (1973) However, this Court noteC in F.!·1.A. 
Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 U.2C: 80, 404 P.2d 670 
(1965), that :ees are "not always required "'.::c be prc·red by 
sworn testimony." Attorney's fees may be proved other than bv 
sv1orn test2-i7.Cl'.': ··.'::er. they are "submitted upcn stipulaticn," in 
other words, when an award is not controverted. Id. Simi-
larly, this Csurt, in Freed Finance Comoanv v. Stoker 1'1otor 
Companv, 53/ P. 2d 1039 (Utah 1975), stated that when there was 
no issue of fact (which would mean the award was uncontro-
verted) , a party may supply the necessary evidence to award an 
attorney fee by an "unrebutted affidavit." Appellants submit, 
however, that ar, award of attorney fees based upon the lower 
court's unso::.icited yet solicitous invitation to the Respon-
dent, weeks after trial, to prepare affidavits, and the result-
ing controverted nature of those a:'fidavits cannot pro·Jide an 
evidentiary basis for an award. 
In her brief, Respondent did not directly deny Appel-
lants' 2.ssertion tr.at rebt.:tted 2ffide.vits alone are insuffi-
cient to suppcrt an award cf attorney's ~ees. Ra t"-er, Pe spcr,-
dent seeks to avoid this issue ty asserting that the Appe::.la~ts 
had an cpportu:iity for a hearing in which they cou::.c ha"E 
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cot ten sworn testiI:'.ony but "waived the opportunity." t'l.ppel-
lants supposedly "waived" this opportunity for hearing by 
assertedly electing to submit controverting affidavits instead 
of requesting a hearing. (RB at 6-7) 
Respondent's waiver theory is unique and innovative, 
but it arises from Respondent's confusion as to which party had 
the burden of proof en this issue. In F.M.A. Financial 
Corcoration v. Build, Inc., o;upra, this Court said that the 
party asking for an award of attorney's fees had the burden of 
proving the fees as a part of her case. Failing to offer 
sufficient proof on this issue "had the same effect as would 
failure to offer proof as to any other controverted issue." 
404 P.2d e.t 674. 
It was the Respondent's burden and responsibility in 
the present case to see that the proper evidentiary foundation 
was laid to support her award of attorney fees. The Appellants 
had no responsibility to assure that the kind of evidence the 
Respondent chose to lay an evidentiary foundation was either 
proper or otherwise sufficient. As Appellants had no burden in 
this matter, they were under no obligation to request a hear-
ing, or to advise Respondent that her controverted affidavits 
submitted to a lower court already disposed to give her the 
award were otherwise insufficient to bear her burden. Appel-
lents' silence upon Respondent's own decision to present affi-
c.c.,,its which Appellants subsequently controverted can hardly 
constitute a waiver of the burden of proof required by Utah 
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law. Indeed, as advocates, Appellants sought the denial c: 
Respondent's belated claim. On appeal, Appellants have unfor-
tunately been constrained tc categorize the lower court• 5 
reopening of the case on Respondent's behalf as both arbitrar;' 
and improper. Certainly ;..ppello.:--.. ts 1 counsel has no qreater 
obligation to assist the Pespondent in meeting her burden b\' 
pointing out prior to ?ppeal that the method she chose was 
faulty. 
Simply stated, the obligation to see that the proper 
evidence was offered was entirely upon Respondent. This burden 
could not be shifted to the Appellants by the lower court's 
ruling that it would decide the issue of attorney's fees upon 
affidavits "unless either party requested a hearing." (R 305) 
The Respondent's "waiver theory" is contrary to Utah law, 
inasmuch as its ultimate effect would be to shift the burden of 
assuring a proper evidentiary foundation for a controverted 
award of attorney's fees to the party opposing the award. 
Next the Respondent argues that the lower court's 
award of attorney's fees is justified because it was in harmony 
with the objective of Rule 54 (c) (1), URCP. (RB at 8 I The 
Respondent cites Palornbi v. D & C Builders, 22 U.2d 297, 452 
P.2d 325 (1969) for the proposition that Rule 54(c) (1) is 
interpreted to allow the trial court to award attorney's fees 
even though plaintiff did not ask for attorney fees in her com-
plaint. The Appellants aqree that this would ir:deed be the 
effect of Rule 54 (c) (1) in a case where the prerequisites set 
forth in Palornbi had been met. In Palombi the Court said: 
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The fact t~at there was no specific pleading in that 
regard dces not preclude such an award. It is indeed 
important that the issue be raised and that the 
parties have cull OPpcrtunit·: tc 1'1eet it. But when 
that is done our rules indicate that there should be 
liberality of procedure to reach the result which 
lustice requires. 452 P. 2d at 328 (emphasis add~ 
In the instant case the Respondent chose to meet her 
burden of proof on the issue of attorney's fees by submitting 
affidavits at the lower court's invitation offered weeks after 
trial. The Appellar.ts had no burden in this regard. There-
after, the lower court, obviously disposed to award Respondent 
her attorneys fees, did so erroneously, on the basis of centre-
verted affidavits and without the e>.id of sworn testimony or 
cross examination. Facing a court which had already indicated 
its inclination to award Respondent her fees, Appellants can 
hardly be faulted in allowing Respondent to abandon an oppor-
tunity for a hearing or by failing to come to the Respondent's 
rescue by requesting a hearing on their own. 
In addition, it is extremely difficult to understand 
how justice could require an award of attorney's fees to the 
Respondent-lessor in this case. The lessors brought suit seek-
ing forfeiture of a lease. This relief was denied because the 
trial court found that the lessors had ratified the continuing 
existence of the lease by acceptance ever nearly three vears of 
$22,400 in rent. During this three-year pendency of the 
proceedings, the Appellants tried in vain to discover the 
~ature of Respondent's claims so that they might be cured, but 
were continually frustrated by the Respondent's unwillingness 
to answer interrogatories. (R 53, 120, 159, 186) Finally, 
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three of the 
disrr.issed as 
lessors stipulated that the corr,plaint 
to them, and that they would bear 
should ce 
their own 
attorney's fees. (R 162) Under these circumstances, it is 0 
mockery to assert that Justice demands an award to the 
remaining Respondent of all attorney's fees expended bv all the 
lessors. The 11.ppellants can only conclude that the instant 
case is not an appropriate case for the operation of Rule 
54 (c) (1) because the Palombi prerequisites are not met. 
Indeed, Rule 54 (c) (1) states that litigants should be granted 
the relief to which they are "entitled." Respondent's failure 
to present anv evidence on attorneys fees at trial entitled the 
Appellants to a favorable ruling on this issue l Respondent's 
failure to present adequate or sufficient evidence after trial 
does not cure this frailty. 
In their brief the Appellants urged that Mr. 
Boutwell' s affidavit is an improper basis for an award of 
attorney's fees because the affidavit nowhere states that the 
Respondent owes Mr. Boutwell these fees also incurred by three 
other lessors in addition to the Respondent, all of whom agreed 
to bear their costs and expenses. (R 337-39; 162) The Respor-
dent speculates that the attorneys' fees awarded to her in this 
case are justified since, "in this case the amount of attor-
neys' time would be the same whether there was one lesser er 
cne hundred lessors." (RB at 7) This argument misses the 
point. The Appellants assert that the purpose of an award of 
attorney fees to reimburse the successful litigant for her 
personal liability for attorney fees. To award the Respondent 
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~ttorneys' fees which where the personal liabilities of ether 
parties is to unjustly enrich the Respondent and penalize the 
,c,opellants. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent's claim that the trial court erred in 
:actually finding that the lessors accepted rent as rent with-
out communicating a contrary intent to the lessees is not meri-
:orious. \ii thout a transcript, the trial court findings of 
fact must be presumed correct. 
ter appeal in this context. 
Respondent has chosen to bring 
Having found as a matter of fact that the lessors 
accepted rent, the trial court correctly determined that the 
lessors waived their right to pursue forfeiture. Indeed, 
waiver would be the result of acceptance of rent regardless of 
the nature of the breaches litigated. Therefore, any possible 
error in denying the Respondent an opportunity to litigate her 
belated claims was harmless error. 
In contrast, the Appellents assert that the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in awarding to Respondent attor-
ney fees when Respondent sought to meet her burden of proof by 
relying en controverted affidavits produced after trial on the 
trial court's own sua sponte invitation. Clearly, the trial 
court itself found as a matter of fact that "no evidence was 
given at trial" on the issue of Respondent's attorneys' fees. 
(Finding !lo. 8, F. 305) Favoring this finding, again, with a 
presumption of truth, it becomes clear that there is not 
sufficient evidence given weeks after trial to belatedly cure 
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Respondent's cmissicn. Respondent now offers only controvert 2 d 
affidavits to support her claim; she has failed to meet her 
burden. For these reasons, the Apcellants respectfully submit 
that this Court should uphold the trial court's refusal to 
forfeit the lease, but reverse the lower court's belated aw8 ~ 
of attorney fees to Respondent. .O..ppellants' attorneys' :'ees, 
testified to at trial and expended in upholding the lease, 
should respectfully be granted. 
')-::{ / 
RESPECTFCLLY SUBMITTED this ~day of March, 1982. 
ALLEN, THOMPSON & HUGHES 
ft'~, - . . ,_, . ,I tr"~--
MitEAEL D. 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Appellants and Cross Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the .2.J.-i day of March, 
1982, I mailed two true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF to John L. Miles and J. MacArthur Wright 
of Atkin, Wright & Miles, attorneys for respondent and cross 
appellant, P. 0. Box 339, St. George, Utah 84770, postage 
prepaid. 
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E>OUJl_LD S?EllT BOUT'.:ELL 
AT'l"OP~H::.r FOP PLAINTIFFS 
COU:lTY C[)U:o:?HCUS E 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
TELEPHONE: 637-4047 
r~m-~---~-~-~ ~.-A.,h.Ht 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTP.!C':' COURT OF w._SHINGTO'.l COilllTY 
STJl_TE OF UTPJ1 
GENEVIEVE A. SMITH; JESSEE E. 
SH.ITS; BETH M. SMITH, and 
SALLI SMITH GIRARD, 
Plaintiffs,: 
vs. 
VERIFIED 
COMP Lil.INT 
CIVIL NO • .....:f..z.,;? 7 
C::APLI'.S L. APPLEBY JR.; DAVID 
E. WOOD; DON BJAR!:JSON; 
C.~THERINE R. APPLEBY; LEONE 
E. \100D; GRACE BJAP.NSON; 
STEVEll ALFRED' and BETH 
ALFRED, 
Defendants.: R# ,)C?cJ/ b 
Plaintiffs allege: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Defendants CHAPLES L. APPLEBY JR.' DAVID E. WOOD, and 
DON BJAFl'ISON entered into a real estate lease ag!'ee..-rnent ~·Tith 
E. PENN SMITH and GEUEVIEVE A. S?-UTH, a~ove named plainti!'=, 
on June 14, 1975, at Washington County, Utah. 
2. !Lri. amendment to said lease agreement ~\'as executed on 
July 23, 1975. 
3. Exhibit "A" , which is attached to this complaint and 
incorporated herein as if f~lly set forth, is a true and correct 
copy of said lease agreement and amendrnent ~Jove-mentioned in 
paragraphs 1 and 2. 
4. Defendants CAT!lERINE R. APPLEBY, LEONE E. ~IOOD, and 
GRACE BJAR!lSON did affix their names to said lease agreement 
and amendment at t.'1.e time said instruments were executed. 
5. CATHERINE R. APPLEBY is the wife of CHAR!.ES E. A.0 PLEBY 
JR. : LEONE E. WOOD is t.'1.e wife of DAVID E. '.·iOOD, and I-PACE 
BJAFilSON is t.'1e wife of DON BJAP.NSON. 
6. STEVEN ALFP.ED and BET:-1 ALPR!:'D are employee agents of 
defendants CHAPLES L, APPLEBY JR.' DAVID E. WOOD, and DO~{ BJF.P3SO:{, 
I Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.-
c 
! ) 
\__. 
( 
' 
I 
' . '-.....,_,· 
O· 
( 
and as such employee a9ents, said STE:v·:::~ ,"'.LF!'"'ED a:;:d J!:'!'S 
Mc:tnage t.'1.e leased premises at t.1-:.e instance and di.r2c':.J..sr1 
said defendants. Said leasee premises are in ~as~1n~t.on Cc~· 
7. Defendants are no··1 in possession of t~e leased nr::--" 
and t.11e defendants claim an interest 1n t..1-ie leased -::ireruse~ 
based upon said lease agreement. 
8. Under the terms of the lease agreement, /'1.ragr.3.r:~ ~ 
requires t..'1at lessee inde!nni.fy and save harmless t.li.e lessor 
against any and all clai:::s arising fr-:>m t.1.e conduct or !"!a:-:a~:.·;· 
of or from any work or thing whatsoever done in or al:iout t..1e 
del!l.ised premises or any building or structure t.1.er2on or be 
~qu.:...?ment thereof during said term or arising du=1ng sa1d ':e!""" 
:roro any condition or any street or sidewalk adJoini~g t:ie 
prel"Uses or of any passageways, or spaces t...i.:.erein or ar:i'J:.ir";.e~'-· 
t..,_ereto, or arising from any act of negligence of t.'le tcna.-:t -( 
or any of its agents, contractors, or e.'TI~loyees, or ar1sinq "''--" 
from any accident, injury or daznage whatsoever, however ca~e: 
to any person or persons, or to t.'1.e oropert.y of any 1Jerson, 
persons, corporation or corporations, occuring during sa1C :~~ 
on, in, or about t!'le leaseC. premises or on or under t.1e si~e··!. 
in front t."lereof, and from and against all costs, counse! fe~: 
expenses, and liabilities incurred in or about any suc:i cla2-- -
or any action or preceeding brought t.1.ereon, and lessee fur::.:· 
agreed to insure said premises for lia.bili ty in the arnount :: 
at least Three Hundred Thousand Dollars 1$300,000.00J. 
9. Plaintiffs are infor:ned and believe and t..'lerefore a .. 
on information and :ielief t:1at defendants have :-:.e•!e!" i:"lsu:~: 
said premises for $300,000.00 as required under t:ie lease ac:) 
10. Plaintiffs have wilfully failed to insure t_'"ie ~eao:: 
premises for t:i.e =equired a.I'lount of liabilit:-' insu!'2.nc~, ~-.: 
for several months since taking oossession of t:--.e -:re!T':!..:e.= -
the lease, the defendants :iave failed to l.nsure t.1e ;;r-:ir;.se: 
•:lit...11 any kind of liability insurance. 
11. 'Pt all times menticned hereir., >::ilair.~if:s l-:a':8 : 
demanded t..'1at lessor :.nsure t:i.e pre:-"'l.Ses fc:ir t.1-::e :-l?C".Jlf?~ 
-2-
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cf liability insurance, and defendani::s !"lave wilf'..illy failed 
to secure such liability insurance. 
12. Plaintiffs are successors in interest of t~e original 
lessor 1 s interest under ~,e lease agreement anC amendment to 
said lease aqreement above-mentioned in ?aragra9hs 1,2,and 3 •. 
13. On or about ~~e 21st day of March, 1978, De:endants 
were served a NOTICE TO CUP.E DEFAULTS. A true CO?Y of said 
notice is attached to this complaint as Exhibit "B" and incorporated 
by reference as if fully set fort..~. 
14. ?.eceipt of said notice :Cy lessees on or about March 
21, 1978, was acknowledged by defendant lessees on April 20, 
1978, in a letter sent to lessor GENEVIEVE A. SMITH by attorney 
Michael D. Hughes. Said letter was also signed by lessee defendants. 
15. Said notice to cure defaults demanded that lessee 
insure the leased premises with liability insurance of $300,000.00 
as required in paragrar-ih 9 of t.'i.e lease agreement within thirty 
days as required under t:.1.e lease agree~ent. 
16. Following receipt of the notice to cure defaults by 
lessee defendants, defendants sent Plaintiffs a copy of an 
alleged insurance binder. One of ~aid insurance binder copies 
is attached to this complaint as Exhibit ncn and is incorporated 
herein as if fully set forth. 
17. Plaintiffs have not received , as yet, any insurance 
policy or copy of any insurnace policy showing that t.~ere is 
t!ie required amount of liability insurance on t.11.e leased E=>reMises • 
18. Ex..11.ibi t ncn, the insurance binder, does not show t.11.at 
there is any liability insurance for injury or damage to the 
property of any person as required under paragraph 9 of t."ie 
lease agreernent. 
19. Exhibit "C 11 also shows that t.1i.ere is bodily injur:• 
liability insurance only in t.1i.e amount of $100,000.~0 for eac:1 
occurrence. ::1is is onl:· one third of t.1.e required amount of 
insurance under t!ie lease agreement. 
20. EY-'1ibit "C" b:• its own terms expired 30 days after 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(__, 
(~. ' ' 
~-. 
~arc.h 29, 1978. 
21. Defendants have faileC. to act in good. fa.it>• ta ..,r:,:
2
• 
liabi:.2-t~· .:..!'lsurance cover3.ge ::::n t...~e ::..e.3.seC :=r·::rrises c~ :s 
::irovide lessor plaintif~s '.vit..11 any policy o:: i:isurance 33 
prov~ded i::1 paragraphs 9 and 15 of the lease e.9reernent. 
22. There is no sublessee of the leased ~remises. 
23. Said lease agreement provides t..'lat lessee s!'lall ~a':~ 
thirty days in which to cure defaults, and at the end of sad 
t..1.irty day ?eriod, if the default cor:.plained of has not ':lee.~ 
cured, then and in t..li.at event the lessor shall have t..-,e ng'.1~ 
to demand full process of la•11 against the leasee and all cf 
:::--.e ir:'L~rcvements, re9airs and additions on said 2.eased ore:r.;.~~: 
shall ~ecome the property of lessor as liouidated daJTlages. 
Said. lease agreement also proviC.es that lessor shall al:::o :--.avE 
the right to re-enter and take possession of said premises on 
default by the lessee. 
24. Lessee defendants are in Cefault under t.1e lease 1~: 
have failed to cure said default wit.."1.in 30 days after rece1v1~.: 
notice of said default. 
25. Because of lessee defendants continuing default 
plaintiffs are entitled to re-ent~r the premises ar.d tate ;:cs:::: .i 
26. Defendants now possess said leased property and :eU: 
to allow plaintiff, or any of t.~ern, to re-enter and ta;:e posse:· 
27. Said lease agreement cons ti. tutes a cloud on plaint:'.: 
title; unless this court enforces said agr~eemnt and pl2ces 
plaintiffs in possession of said 9roperty, r;laintiff "'ill '.:ie 
prevented from using and enjoying t..'1.e rig;1tful o~¥nerslnp and 
possession of said property. 
28. "/<_s a result of defendants default and refusual :c 
allo'.·l plaintif~s tQ re-P.nter and t.=.k.e _?Cssession of <4:'.!e l9"-;e.: 
premises, plaintiffs have had to retai:i the ser'Jl.::es cf ar. 
attorney to enforce the terms of t:-te lease ?.gr~er.e:"'.t and tc' 
exercise the rights and remedies t~1ereunder as 'Yell as ct:-.~: 
rights and rerr.edies pro•tided =y la··;, Plainti£:':s 3.r2 t.1 ~=~·· 
entitled tQ recover reason~le at~or~ey f ·ees. 
( 
\ 
( 
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SEcm;o CADSE OF' ACTIO:l 
29. Plair.tiffs inco~orate ~erein oaraqranhs 1 th=ough 
28 in plaintiff's First Cause ':if Act.ion as if full~' set forti1. 
30. '!'he lease agreement pro•:ides t.11at t..1.e leased premises 
shall be operated in ~~e main as a recreational ~~d ~~eraoutic 
spa. 
31. Such operation allo•.vs many customers to come onto 
the premises for the purpose of bathing in a pool area and a 
grotto area. 
32. In the pool area, ~~ere are no life guards or :3.nyone 
else to prevent accidents or prevent small children from swimning 
~~attended in the large swinuning ~col. 
33. The grotto area is located under steep cliffs of roc~s 
and bouldars. Occasionally a rock or boulder will fall onto 
the grotto area where bathers are bathing. 
34. Plain~i!f are inforned and ~elieve and t~erefor2 allege 
on information and belief ttat during the last few months during 
periods of rain, large rocks and boulders fell from ~1e stee~ 
cliffs around t.~e grotto area and pool area, and that some of 
these large rocks and boulders fell accross a pathway used ~y 
customers and smashed through a wooden fence. 
35. Operation of the leased preflti.ses poses risks of injury 
to body and property. It is because of such risks t.~t plaintiffs 
have continually tried to make lessee secure liability insurance 
on the premises as provided for in ~,e lease agreement. 
36. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and therefore 
allege on information and belief that t.~e lessee defendants 
cannot indemnify plaintiffs adequately against a'ly and all clair'.s 
arising frorn the conduct, management, or acts 0£ negligence 
unless liability insurance coverage in t~e su~ of $300,000.~0 
is ?rovided by the lessee defend~ltS as required in t,~ lease 
agreement. 
3 7. Lessor plaintiffs have no ad.9quate remedy at la• .. to 
protect themselves and t...'1eir ':l!"Operty if liabilit:' insurance 
-s-
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is not carrieC on tje leased ?reMises as pro'.'id2C ::.::i ":;-.e ~~=-:: 
agreement. Without adeq\,;,a't.e liab.:.l.ity insur3.nce, 8lai:-:.<:..::: 3 
liabj_li ty shoulC ?laintif:s not enfor=e t:-.e terms of th-= :e~::" 
ai;r~ement ?.s to liabilit:: insurance. Plaintiffs fe'3.r t'.lat ~ 
=ause of action could arise in the imnediate future :rcM 3::: 
on the leased prerrises t~at would involve the ?laint1f:s iJ ~= 
that adeauate liability insurance is !"lot obtained ::iy deien::3..~: 
:or the benefit of t..l-ie plainti.ffs as required in t!le :ease a~=:· 
ment. Suc!i. 11abili ty exoosure :>ecause of the lack of adec;,13 ~~ 
liability insurance could cause immediate and irre?arable £::-.:: 
losses to ~11e ~laintif=s. 
38. l:nless t..11e court immediately !"estrains the defenC~ .. 
frol"I opi:;rating t!"le leased preI!l.i.ses as a business and e-.llc· .. :.:.::: 
people to COl!le onto t..11e premises without $300,000.00 of L.~ ... 
\ 
i:isurance for bodily injury and property damage, plainti:fs ;:,:J - "-
proper":y will :::ie subject to imr.:ediate and irreparable ll~1::: 1 
for which plaintiffs ~ave no aC.eq-:Jate remedy at law. 
39. The lease agreement does not proviC.e t!'lat lesso: 
may pay insurance preminl.lif'.s and look to lessee for reimburse~= 
Therefore, if lessor diC. 9av insurance 9remiurns, le5sor wou:: 
have to bring a multiplicity of la•.vsuits in an attem?t to :c .. · 
back such premiums from lessee. Plaintiffs, t:-ierefore, ha'1€ 
no adequate remedy at la:.,. 
40. Unless t!1e court ternporari ly enj cir.s :.es see ::e:~-:~· 
during the penC.ency of this action from 09erat1ng the l.ease: {~ 
premises witl1out $300, 000. 00 of liability i::.surance for Jc: .. 
injury as well as pro?erty darnaqe, plaintiffs '-Yill have :-:c ;: 
remedy at law. 
40. Unless the court ?e!"rna:lentl'i enjoi:is 2.~ssee 
from operatinq t.:i.e leased prer.iises wit.:i.out. SJOJ ,'.3JJ.~~ ~­
insurance for boCily i:1jury as well as ?ropert'./ C.3.f.12'.ge, :.:. 
will have :10 aC.equate :::ernedy at la·\' t.:.:i:.ess the ccur't :es:::~' 
-6-
---
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
possession of ~~e ?remises to ~lair.tiffs as prayed for in plain-
tiff's First Cause of Acti~n. 
4.:.. Defendants s:-... ould ::,e ordereC. t.o sr.o·,; cause ·;hy the 
court should not enjoin defendants fro~ ocerating said lGased 
premises ~\·ithout first ::>rocuring $30'J,OOO.OO of liability i:isur-
ance as provided in paragraph 3 of the lease agreement. 
VrdLPEFOP~; plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants 
as follolls: 
1. Declaring defendants have =reached the terr:tS of the 
lease agreement. 
2. Quieting plaintiff's title to ~~e real property de-
scribed in ~~e lease agree~ent. 
3. Placing plaintiffs in possession of t..~e leased pro~erty. 
4. Declaring that defendants and all persons claiming 
under t..~em have no estate, right, title or interest in or to 
said real property described in the lease agreement. 
S. For a restraining order pro~ibiting t~e defendants 
from operating the leased premises without first obtaining 
5300,000.00 of liability insurance against bodily injury and rroperty 
damage for each occurrence. 
6. Pora tem;iorary injunction during the pendency of 
this action enjoining the defendants from operating tbe leased 
premises ~lit:1out first obtaining $300,000.00 of li~ility insur-
ance against loss for bodily injury and oroperty damage. 
7. For a permanent injunction permanently enjoining 
the defendants from operating the leased pro~erty as a business 
during the terr.i of the lease with out having $300, 00 0. 00 of 
liability insurance as required in paragraph 9 of ~~e lease 
agreement. 
8. For temporary attorney fees t.~at are reasona~le as 
determined by the court at the order to shcrN cause hearing. 
9. For reasonable attorney fees as determined at time 
of trial. 
10. ror such other relief as t.~e court may deem just 
and prooer in the orer.rises . 
. - - -~ 
Dated this ~Cay o! ~!ny, 19i8. 
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~as read the foregoing complai~t, '..L.iCerstar.ds :.t, a.;.d :.e __ _ 
l t t~ he tr·..:e. 
4c.,{'f:~:'~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR"l to !:e.:0'.:lre me on <:.~ii.IA~ oa:· _, 
>.lay, 1978 . 
;!y ccrnmiss ion expires: 
MY c;1.1·•:;;10N EXPIRES 
$[ I · '··· 11, 1160 
Plaintiff, JESSEE L"' SMI'!'H, 'Jeing first s·,.,orn, says ~e 
has read the foregoing com9laint, understands 1 t, and l:iel:e•:e. 
it to be true . 
(L~µ 1 ~ti 
ss;: E. Sl'ITH, ? i2:Gto:: 
SUBSCRIBED A."lD SWORJI to b fore me on this\!~da,· c: 
!lay, 1978. 
::y cornni ssion expires: 
t •. ! C:!:"·:::oN EXPIRES 
S£;..r~:.::~:i? 16 12aa 
- /I /~ rJ I . , I 
!
'_,,...., /1"( ;',... /· i / 
: .<.__.. l L c \_ ' • /I ( ,_ ..• -::.... 
~O':'ARY PUBLIC' - Resid.ir.q a~ 
~ 1-,,1r(]( !i+-,11 (""· 
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?laintiff, BETH:': . .S~'.l::i, ~e.i:-.g fl.=s": swor:-i, sa:_ls she '.1as 
read the foregoing ~omplaint, understands it, and believes it 
i:o :ie true. 
B~r:?" ~'(;J' -_i r i:.._ ••• .:i •• i , aintir: 
SUBSCRIBED A1lD Sl10R.'l to before me on t.'1iJ'~;..y 3 1978day of 
~!ay, 1979. 
:--!y com."11i.ssion expires: 
MY co:.'Ji,;:~/ON EXPIRES 
SEPT~,"v~~ 15 1oag 
P lai!'ltiff, SP..LLI S!:I':'!i c:::p~_r.o, being first sworn, says 
she has read t.~e foregoing complaint, understands it, and be-
lieves it to be true. 
C'\ S'0o . .Q'vp .S.,,..v..-d ~et~ 
SALLI s:~ITH GIPARD, Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this!.::..: c 137Qlay of 
May, 1978. 
~OTARY ?UBLIC - Res1a1ng ai 
:·~y commission expires: 
MYss~~,~:·~:;:;cn fXP1,Es 
~1 C1fcrr1r 
I I 
i ltrrh 
- ........ 16. 1980 
-9-
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-:- ?S:f!r 3!~:::?F. A:I9 G::l!:::1/I:7.S :;::ITH, hi~ uifc, of ?i:-it~;~ 
LE.3S0:-1S, ~-id. CC_4..~L!:3. L .. ~~??~~~Y R a:-id D,"~YID i:;. ~l'JOD of 
"I 
~ I T U E S S S T -
";~is C.~7 le:::..::cd to Les:>e?e fo!'" :i ter::::. of t\1enty (20) year: 
f'ollo-.·iin6 ciesc:-ibed tr~ct ~f lc.nd i:i. ·.;ashi:is,ton County, U:. 
s:gi:!:iir.g ~t a ~ .. ,~.n~- !:i ... :-1• :<l1;: -:t the c~a...1:1cl or Yi:r.: 
river loca .... ed dirBc .... .!.J .J~:.l:..h J.r-::;n a :µciint lS.4 chair.; 
3ast oI..,, 11orth·,;~st cv:-:!-=:- of t~e ]0:-the.'.:..st ~ South~e.s-, 
Sectio.:i 26, To!tns!lip 4.1 3J'..!L!°!, ;-,na;c 13 ~-Ti?::t, Salt 
Lake :-~aridia:i t!nd r'.!...~=:.~s th·;~r:.e ··~:)rt!-2 9.4 ch:?ins, ---
::io:-e or4.. le!is ..... t~ a pc~?t. .. 1·'-fae~ ... 3oi:~h of ': ,l~ne :ep1.·] 
tl::e Sou ... ~easw :;: and ... .=e .• o ... t!:lc~ ... t -.~ of' s":i.a. ::::;~ct!on tr tb~nca sguth 87° East 9. 7 chains, :-=:.:-t:-e o~ le3Sj th~~:~' 
South 23 45 1 \Jest 5.4 chains; tb.ance South 68'Ea 9t 
24.50 chains, :'J.l)!"e f'.'I:' less, to the !ili ddle -..f V5.rr;in ?: ~ 
to e point, which is 14 ch::lins Uest and 15 chains SQ~:: 1 
.r:-o::i t.!J.e ~Iortheast co:=-;:iar of -;;~e Svu th·,1est I:i Sectio~ 
25; the:::ce i"ollou d:>::.~strea:n t!::.e m~.Cd.le o;.. .. the River· 
tha point 0£ beoinni~g.. AL30: Be;;innin~ at a P"int i 
cr..'.?.i~s South of the ::.Jrt::::est ~o!'n~:c tJf t~~ South11es: 
So:.i-;h::est ~ Section 25, lo::n5!1ip l1-l South, Ro.nt;C? 13 
·::ast, 'Sr!.lt LO'.?.!:a l:urid.!..2..""1 ~.r.d ("t!':'!:l.!:1g t:i~nce .S:tst JO\~ 
~l-iei:.ca ::o:-therly JO c:~-:i.:!:;, i':'l •. •.,,"'C ~r l.3~s :.o the point: 
in::~rSQC~ion o~ tha :-:iC.dle or \;:::~ ci~:'.:'.!:lel of the Vir;: ,\..--
•?.:ive:- ;;ith the line .=c~~:x.i··atin3 tbe So:i~h~r~st ~~ and~.1.cl' 
we.st ~'- o!' Section 25; :::ie!l .follcu ti·:n:nstrea.m. the mid~· 
-of the River to e noi~t ".(-ie::-e s2id. !'i ver intersect~:.:.: 
Easterly bou:1dary ii::ie 0£ Rir;h.:~2:7 U-17; the~ce SJuth~ 
04 1 l!est 1.5 ch::ins, ':":o:-e or less to the South bound~~ 
o:r l!~rtheast ~.; Southeast ~ Secti~n 26; thence East 
19 chains, more o:-. less to the Southeast corner of t:i 
t?ortheast !,q; Southeas~: tha:ice South 10 chains to 
begin..~ing. Containi~g 110.24 ~crcs. 
S'oge~hor ~Ji th all i=?ro7enents th~re1:n1 n.:i.d. C.':ipurten~.:' 
t!J.ereto, i:icludi:1g ::.:::i7 a..t.d .?.11 :;:i:1:n ... ~ls, oil, G2.S e..~: 
uater ric;:-b.ts runnin?.: ~;i th 9;,; s .,....,. ... , ..,_.. ...... 2 ... rt-...,.. and 
includini the invento.:.J shci::t r~arlc2d :s:;<l1ibit 11A11 , 
~ttached hereto. 
the !Dssc:.s. /.Jc/ 
_.t;<_J 
..,..[/Jl 
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T..-i.i3 Lcct:;e ~hc.11 be ;;cr:1etuc.lly rone-..10.blc on itJ o:::i 
t:=~ i'or ::ddition:>.l t•.1ent;; (20) year period3 on the ocme tCI'!:l!l 
.?..nd conditions 2.S herein cont.o.ined a.11d the option to reni:?w will. 
or assib!lS, who r.iay revoke :Jaid Lease by written notice to Lessor 
at t!1e end of nny ona (1) year period. 
?o!" -~l. OC Lessor t.crcb:r ~i 7a3 cxclusi ve option to purcho..se here-
i.."1 ab~i.. e described ~=-c~crty to Lessee. This option is to re-
n.3.in in e!"f'ect as long as tho property is -;.nc1.er lease. The 
selling price shall be the ap?raised valuo at the time or sale. 
2. PAYl:?-,~T OP R3=!T:. In con3ideration or the Lease 01· 
said p:-e~ses herein d~scribed Lessee does agree to pay Lessor 
ranttls as rollows: 
A. Eight '.i".c.ousand four hundrad (.tS,l+OO) on the 15th 
C"-Y of July, 1975 which cball be the lease r>a:'I,J<mt for the i'irst 
;-._= of said le.'.!se a-'1d sl:all i"'U-'1 to the 15th C.:!y af July, 1976. 
B. On ~he 15th cay of July. 1976, the Les3or shall 
pay se-,.en hundo·ed dolla'.:'s C}/Jl_Oj ::.."Id the lease pa~-.~ent shall 
be seven hundred dollars ($700) per month i'or each month there-
a:rter. 
c. During the 3econd year o~ this lease Lesser sho.11 
be entitled to Four P~rc'cP.t {i~~) o~ the i;ross sales of all 
businezs activities car~i~d on ~n the iensed premises in 
e;{c~:::s of .:;3,000 p·3·r 1~o:nt!":.. Du:-ing the third year of this lc:i:;13t 
I~e::sC'r zh:tll ~e .. "!niitlcd to Po!lr Percent (4~) o!' the gross· s~los 
o~ :lll b:.:siness ncti•1ities ca:·ried on on the leased premises in 
r.::c::ss of: 33~ 000 !::a:" 1~or.th. !tJ.ring the fourth ye:ar 0£ this leF.s~ 
x1:: c.::.c:i yc:l.T" thePe::?.i-tar as l~:ig c.s said lease remains in f'Ull 
i--c;."ce a ·..:G. ~3.":'ac~, :0.Js~o:.-- s:u!ll be entitled to Five Ferce:it (5:"!) 
0£ : 1Q- ,:.:"JSS ~;·1~3 r:,; .. !'.11 'bH!::.:ncZ3 ~ctiv·.!.tiCS co.rricd. On j>:} t!:e 
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Lessee ~nC: Lessor s!'!e;.11 sha!'e equally (50~ to e2c!1) <:!...-i.:r 
:-evenu~s d~rlved ::-o::l drilll:i.:; foz- £)-:?Other.Jal hce_t enerr;y 
by a t:~i!"'d p::!rty sablease as refer!'"ed in pa!'"as:-c.ph :!18. 
The preolses a.nd fac111 ties s1Jbject 
to t!""~1s Lease shc.11 be operated in the ca.in as recren.tional 
a.~d the~a:;:r~tic spa: Lessees c~y perfo:-~ all t'.lnctlons 
necessary to carry en said ope!"2.t1ons to5,,ther >:1th those 
:ru.~ct1ons and opsr~tio~s necessar7 to c~!"ry on b~siness 
rel~:te:i to. the develop2ent of t~e Spa; 1nclud1ne; but not 
l1t:1ted to restau!"~-:t, b.ousin5 fac111t1es, hotels notels, 
trailer p~~ks, caves, and the ~1nin5, za....~ufactur1n5 ~~d 
s~le of cos~etics O!" a.~y ot~er tunct~on econoaically 
i"e:!.sa.ble. r'ne :::iea::.!.n:; c.:.nd p1..1!"pose of this section is to 
insure thE.t the sps. or hot sp!"i!lt;s '.::111 be the center of 
t.he b:.isi.?less e.ct.1 v-1 ty on said p!"en1ses; alJ. other ~ct1v1t1es 
bei:ir; relc::ted or i:lcidc:i t tl-:.e!"eto. 
tree, 
?.1ver 
Lessee shall have r1c~t to 
ass!Gn or su~-1~:.se t!':c pre=.ises he!'ein de5cr.!bed ,·1th 
the · ..:ri tte:'!. CO!lSe::!~ of L~s~c!" b~t s'l'bject to r:.11 t~e 
ter~s a~d co~~1t1o~s ~ere!~ set forth. 
(~:/, .. 
. , ,.- , . ( 
/.,kl:.. 
I 
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~te~ ~ottlcd a~d soll. 
I~ is the~e~ore ~e~~ ~ ~:~eed t~st 1n case the ~-ssee·c~':lnot 
,-,_ .!·~'--_, ·..:-' '.f..' ~('· 
p:it 1:=1 ~ Cottle1-"15 ;_la.~t ~:1. "':. 1 -:-:. t;;o ,.~=:.: , :'!'o:l the iet tinG or i'v • ... .J 
t~is le~se; ~ thi!'d ~/~/. 
O!' Leszee to 
a.11~ s::c.!"ed. h!!.lf to the Le 
~ro= t~e hot ~inerel sp~i!':.ss ~~all be use1 on the leased 
p!'e2ises 2.:ld s~all not be pipe~ therefro~. 
be ~ro~~ted as of t~e Cate of t~is lease and thereafter, 
t~·:es, inclu:ilnG real esta.~e t~:·:es a...'"'!d assesszie!'lts, and 
:::in::. :·:!:.a'tsoever, whic~ ~ar be {a) levied, !nposed or assessed 
O!l t1:e real estate hereby de=:ised, ·or on a-::..7 1!i:!provece:J.ts 
t~~eo~, ~t a:lY tioe after the ~ate of this lease and prior 
'to it.s e::;>ire.tio:i, or (b) leviee., iz=!posed, or assessed on 
e.~7 inte~est o~ the Lesso~ 1.~ o~ u....~a~ th!s lease; or (c~ 
r1~ch. t.:::.e I.essor shall be requi!"ed. to pa7 ree.son 01." or on 
eccoU!l.t c~ his 1nte~est 1~ the re~ estate hereby decised a...~d 
t.Ce 1~p!"OVe~e~t.s o~ s~id real es~~te. ~e~Tsuch tax, assess~ent, 
ccve:!e._~ts to inde::..."li~"':r ~~cl sc:ve h.a.~less the Lenser a.Ga.inst 
o~ :-::-c:: e.;,7 wor2: or t:=-_i~c '.~li:!.tsoe7er do!le !!'?. or about the 
a.djoi:!ins the 
. ·1 ,-_. i 
. l. ..• ~--/ ··, 
.·-
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to ~-:lY person or p· rsons, or to tho Dr~oe;-t.y of 211y ptr::;;, 
so.1s, cor='ora.tion O!" cor;JO:;-;".tion~, occu:-inc; durin; s2.id 
i!1, o:- ab:......_t ~ ... he l~ascd pre~J.:.es o.c o:i. or unde=- tbe 3id1:: .. ~ 
in front the~eor, a~d r~orn ~nd asainst all costs, coun:el :. 
c=:p~:i~es, and li2bilitiez inc\1rr~d in or ab0ut a..'1y such cle:..: 
or any ac"tion or p:-cceedi:lS ":irou;:.;:1t t:ie:"'~on, 2.....'l"]d i'urther a;~: __ 
to in~ure said pro::.izas ror liability in t:=i~ .:.n::::unt of 2.t l: 
l':c'-""ee !::unc'.rad C:nouoa.::d Dollo.rs ($300,000.0~·). 
10. :;!~.3?E 0~ D~\!·:..~.G~S: Lessee ac~:no-. .:~e~ges that i: 
:t'.2.s eZ:?..:'!.i::-.ed t~1e C.e::.ised pre'!':!i~es prior to the :;;,a..:,{in3 of 
".·!ill C.?.:!"a .for s2.id ~;.:-c;:i:.!:as in a reaso;i,able e.::-id !J!'UG.ent l:12.".: 
11. U!IT.,..!_~·::-JL U3E ?~OHIE! ?2D: It is u::!<ler3toad a::: 
agreed bet;;een the parties !iereto that S2.id p~e!llses will r.:· 
be used· J:or any pu??o:>se in ·1iolation of' any 12.•1, county or:::~ 
or r-a~lation, of the C:JU.'r'Jty of '.\'a!jhin~ton, St:?..te of Utah. 
12. In the e7ent of a default i:·. 
I 
\._, 
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~~!~~io~s o~ s~1d leased p~e=ises sCall becoae the property 
==c:::Z..::.!.cs .!.1e:?.s -(:!".1c:: ~::all -=~ yle.ced o~ saiC p?-operty 
I 
:.::....-::·.:.~ ~!:!.e actiO!!S or L:SS2S't, ~ .. re:;. a.:?1. a.rte!" the effective 
z-:z Lessee 1:1.ll be res!)onSlble ·ro-r 
;:ace~ the!"ec~ after t~e L~c=~tion o~ t~is lease and said 
o: ... f!.~e a...'"lC. l~abil1 ty !.ns:i:-~:::e policies a.s t:tey a.re obtained 
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develop.=ent of the hot ~i:::.e!'".:!..l 1·:z.~ers cs 1t er-:er.:;es f!'oa 
Lessee. 
develop=e~t of seotter=~l heat s~all be app~oved by both 
Lessor a.."ld Lessee 1::i. :·:ri tL'1C. ;_-iy such ageeoe=1t shall 
provide fo~ adequ~te co=?e~satio::i. to Lessees for sue~ 
de.:Jages as t~ey may sustaL~ to t~e overall oper~tio~ of 
the leased ~re=ises 1nc~~d1n3 bat not l1a1ted to t~e 
operation of a health spa, p~od~ctio::i. of cosoetics, etec. 
r· t!!e event of' dcf'a~l t b;r 
Lessee, t~e in?~ovene~ts sit~atej on s~1d ?~ope~ty at 
the ti.ue of the Cef~ult s~all !'"C~~1~ o~ the leased 
pre:llses 2.!ld becooe the ~ro?erty of Lessor at the tioe 
oi" defa~t. 
constita!.es the entire z.5:-ee=c.::it beti .... een the parties. 
a..~d a~ee~ that until the Lessee has 
the r..ot 
ple_,t for tha recove~ or ~iner~ ~ from 
2oc~te~ c~ t~ese pr __ scs, end a 
o-=== to t~e Lessees. 
pac~.i::a:e cos?:etics, 
f. .J·I , i 
i 
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·-==-: ;- - .... 
1:-: or to 
!.e::.sc. 
_·_·--- r.~:-- of' . ..,.... -~--=-=----· 1975. 
c--., 
/ L ,'." - .c:./. -. · 1-.:/ 
I ,,-. . 
. ./ , I I . _·:.( __ <.1-{f,, ./.,..-/ .,_·_. 
SS. 
C:o ~::e :2 .. ...,,,.,.·"""'_.._,_._.;_, 1975, !-'~::. .. so:::~J..17 ~'!'pec~ed 
-· ?~~~ c~~t~ ~~i c-e~s7~eve 
ST.\TE OF C.UlFOR."'1.\ } 
COt::'\"TI- OF Sap pjgoo SS. 
()n iune·J:!. · 1975 belore me. 
~ unCl"":"':ri~ • ;\oury Public ia and for M.id Counry and St.ate. 
penuD~Y a;ii-red Cttho.rjr .. R Appleby 
-------------- knowa lo tne 
10 ~ ~e ~who-.e name----'ub$Cribed to the 
,,.,~m i:'l."'U"Uii>enl Cid ack.nowl~t!'d th.a~1ecu&l:d the 
Car:ha-i;te ; Va:iderbeek / 
l\ame 'Typed or Pl"lnt.ed) 
'.'oUl1' PU.Lie io and for uid Couoty and SLA1e 
s!.~ors 
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~he p~rties ~o the lease heretofore executed o: 
1975. le,.sir:g the precises generally known a~ P2.h ~"'''° 
hot mineral springs hereby agree to o.Iller.d paragr2ph:; 4,~ 
of s~iC 1e4~e to read as follows; ~ 
4. Lessor C:i.I!.d Le4~ees Reserves re1;1.]. uroner.+;; 2.nC. 
c:1.nnurtena...~ts: 
Lessor and Lessees agree to ;>e:r::ii t E. Perm ~!:iJith d.C"' 
and use oi the rock buildi!lg on the north side of the v::; 
river, directly north of the present g:rotto and the:reai'·· 
property on which said building is loc2.ted o.nd the real 
property extending 100 feet north_ and south of said builoi:j· 
300 feet e._st .,,nd west of said building, for personal "" 
d!ld experl_r;:ienttl use, including the uoe of ::i.ineral water·· 
rent free. 1 
The Lessees and E. Penn ::;mi th .. hal.l both have use o'. 
well located on said.property • 
...11 pa...-ties .. gree to limit use or diversio10. of the'>: I (,... 
w .. ters on this property so a" not to appreciably diz:.ish ;:1 1 
current ..nd usua1 flow fro:i: the the=als and/c-r springs 
situ .. ted on the leased premise,.. 1 
at such tUie as E. Penn "1111 th does not have personal ,.I 
for sdd rock building and real property discri'oed in th:, I 
paragraph it shall be returned to the lessees for their ':Oi,' 
For the consideration of one dollar the Le~sees sh.i: 
hc:.ve 1st option to pu.rchc.~e equipment in the rock buildi~g, 
6. t:aters..les 
It is of cutual i..lterest for the lessor and leosees 
have cinera1 water bottled and sold. 
It is therefor herein c:.~eed tb.o.t in cci.z,e lesseet:1 car.~, 
e.,t,.blish processing .,,nd o"'rketi:c.g of bottled w .. ter withi' ' 
2 years froo the effective date ot this lease a third par~ 
m.,y be sought by either the lessor or les~ee.,. The third 
p..rty .,hal.l be approved by both lessor ..nd lessees. 
The profi t:o from such venture to be equal.ly di7ided \;:1 
..nd lessees • 
.:::o. I'.a.nu:!"o.cture and ::;tle of co~!::etics. 
The lessor agree .. to provide the le.,see., the com"lete 1 
cosoetic fo~ulation processes. 
Until the lessees have their coSIOetic plant ready ior 
operation the lessor agTees to furnish cosnetic ite~s in 
quanties sufficient for sales at the rate of 60% of retail 
when bottling is provided by lessor or 4<::1> of retail when 
betting is provided by lessees. . 
If after 2 years fron dated of aaid lease the sales o: 
cosoetics fail to reach a IOUtually agreed volui::e a third'". 
roay be sought by either lessor or lesaees. The third par~ 
shall be anuroved by both lessor a10.d lessees. 
Profits froro such venture to be equally cli vided by l•f'' -._ 
and lessees. 
Dated this---21_ day of _ _,J'-'==='"'"-----' 19~:. 
--/ .. 
Lessors;; 
~. .r'eD.!l ~i -en 
LesseE:Sj 
r - , , _/ -
cnarles.~ ,::;>pl-;;by, 1Jr. 
·' J \ 
\. '(_'-~- _,/ --·.:-, 
_,/ Da-vici ..c.. ·.•1ood 
/ 
/ -- I --cat;nerine a . .1.'.J'.Jle' 
'--./.-
,"7"• 
Leone 1 . .000. 
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TO: CHA.qLES L. APPLEBY JR. 
DAVID E. WOOD 
DON BJAR.'ISON 
FROM: GENEVIEVE A. SY.ITH 
JESSE E. SMITH 
BETH M. SlUTH 
SALLI SMITH GIRARD 
~otice to cure defaults within ~~irty {30) davs is 
hereby given to CHARLES L. APPLELBY JR., DAvID E. WOOD, 
and DON BJARNSON, lessees of that certain "Lease Agreement" 
between themselves and E. PENN SMITH and GENEVIEVE SMITH, 
lessors, and which was executed on June 14, 1975, and amended 
on July 23, 1975. This notice is given as provided in para-
graph 13 of said lease agreement. 
Specific defaults under the lease agreement which must 
be cured wi t.'l t.'lirty ( 30) days are as follows: 
1. Lessees must insure t.~e leased premises for liability 
in the ar.-:ount of at least Three Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($300,000.00) to cover the agreement of inde~r.ification as 
provided in paragraph 9 of said lease agreement, and lessees 
must furnish lessors a copy of said liability insurance policy 
as provided in paragraph 15 of said lease agreement. 
2. Lessees must insure all improvements on t~e leased 
premises against loss by fire in amounts adequate to orotec~ 
lessors interest, and lessees must furnish lessors a copy 
of said fire insurance policy showing that lessors interest 
is protected as provided in paragraph 15 of said lease agree-
rnent. 
3. ~essees nust not continue to operate the leased 
prem.ises in violatio~ of Utah State Division of Heal~~, Code 
of Ca~9, Trailer Ccurt, Hotel, ~otel and Resort Sanitatio~ 
Regulations, adopted by the t:'ta.:; State Board of Healt!'l on 
?e'-Jruary 21, 1968, ~nder authority of 26-15-4, u.c.A., 1953, 
as amended. 
onge 1 of 3 ~ages 
- -x d , T '',-. C 11 /U/ ;.:; 
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4. Lessees must elimi::iate waste 0:'.1 t~e leased ::ire:'1ises 
and restore said leased: :,::remi.ses to t.~at condition w~1c~ t':e 
leased ?remises would now be in if said leased ::irerruaes ~ad 
been cared for in a reasonable and prudent manner as pr0v1deC 
in paragraph lO of said lea3e agreeme:i.t. PartlC'.l~ar .3.reas 
'Nhere lack of care or waste has allowed tt:e leased :=rerrl.l.ses 
to become dilapidated are as follows: 
{a). The grotto area on the leased premises has become, 
and continues to be, unclean, unke?t and dangerous to users. 
(b). The swimming pool area is falling into disrepair 
and is a health hazard. The pool area is in violation of 
the Utah State Division of Health, Regulations Relating to 
'.)peration and !-1aintenance of Public Swinning and Wading Pools. 
(c). The catin motel units are falling in Cisrepair 
and are not in clean, sanitary and operable condition. T~ere 
is no adequate or approved screening to control insects and 
the windows, shades, curtains, furniture and fixtures are 
not clean and in good repair. The units are in viol~tion 
of State law as refered to in paragraph 3 above, as well as 
county health laws. 
(d). The roads on the leased premises are in disrepair 
with chuck holes and inadequate graveling. 
(e). Electrical and plumbing on the leased premises 
is unsafe and does not comply with any standard of safety. 
Genevieve A. Srnith, Jesse E. Smith, Beth Smith, and 
Salli Smith Girard are successors in interest to the leased 
premises. 3ee Quit Claim Deed recorded August 23, 1977, 
·,.;ith the Washington County Pecorder, .aook 224, Page 240, 
Reference 186462. Attachment "A" is a cooy of Quit Claim Jee·: 
Service of this notice on any l.essee ;:iart'/ :.s "'.ot:::e 
to all lessees as partners and agents of each othe=· 
:~o waiver of t:i.is notice or t'.'"le reouired ':.~i='ty ''.3~ 1 
days to cure the above-mentioned defaults ·Ni.ll .:ie ?rant.ed 
unl!2!ss in '.'lri ting and siqneC. ::iy al: parties concer;;.ed. 
':l.3.ae 2 af ::ages 
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In the event that the above mentioned defaul~s, or any 
of them, are not cured within thirty ( 30) days following 
service of t.11.is notice 'Jpon lessees, or any of th.em, t..'1en 
lessors will institute legal action to recover possession 
of t..~e leased premises and will re-enter and take possession 
of the leased premises, and lessors will take all legal steps 
necessary to insure that lessors recover possession of said 
leased premises. 
Should legal action be necessary to recover possession 
of ~~e leased premises, lessors will ask t..~e court tor aL 
award of attorney's fees against lessees, and each of them, 
for all reasonable attorney's fees incurred by lessors in 
( enforcing the terms of the lease agreement or any other rights 
or remedies available t~ereunder as provided in paragraph 
12 of the lease agreement. 
This tlOTICE TO CURE DEFAULTS "as signed on this ___ day 
of ~tarch, 1978. 
GENEVIEVE A. SMITH 
JESSE E. SMITH 
BE'r'H :1. SMITH 
\ 
SALLI SMIT:! GI'.\ARD 
page of 3 ?ages 
;:. I 
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;r 12 .00 '.\1. Fee Paid S 3. 00. 
by 
\b1l tax nocice to Address 
QUIT-CLAHvf DEED 
Genvieve A Sc1ith, Jesse E Sr:-ich, ar'd 3eth fl. SG".ith, his ·..;1fe. (', 
Smith Gicard, Penn Harris Scic.h, and ~!3.ry A. S::ii:h, his wi~e. 
of , Cou:lty of W2s::-i.ington , Sc.He of l!t.1h, 
QUIT-CLAIM to Ge"levieve A. S[!1ith, thirty three and one-c'nird 
uercent (33 1/3'/ .. ); Jesse E. SLI!ith, and Beth !'I. Sc:-1ith, :1.is wife, as 
Joint ten2nts with i"ull :righc of survivorshi?, chirty Three c.-iC c:ie- I 
third percent (33 1/3~',); and Salli Smith Girard, thirtv three anG 
one-third oercent (33 1/3?,), · g""" 
of ',Jcshington C9untv, Utah for U.e sl.!mo: 
!en Dollars a~d N0/"00-~----------------------------------DOLLA~, · ( 
the fo\lo,:i.>ing des.:ribed trJct of bnd in Washington 
Sure of Uuh: 
0'2~::.xiT"lg at a point in uri.ddle of cile chaTinel of \i:'...r_5:...:1. Rive= loca:ed 
di.:'.'.eC':: -'! Sout..~ from a ?Jint 15 4 c!iain..s E2.St of ::orc.r:-.·est Corne!" of 
c._-,E ::.y:---_:-e25: ;:_ Souc.hest :: Sec:ion 26, TC' .. -:--.s'-.ip ~2. SoL:.~'-L. ?..G.._-._;e lJ 
·,..,·e:s:, S22.: J_'.:.e }'i:.r-~d.iG..1. c._-.d ::-.s_:ing L:.,e:-ice: ~~-or:.."I 9. 6. c~c=S:.s, ru'.:'e C>r 
~ess ;::o a ;:>oint 30 feet Sou:.:'-i 'Jf a li.rie s<qerati..11g :~e Sou:.:-.,east :: c..-id 
C:.:-ie ~:oru'teast ~of so.id Sectio;:-i 26. t..~e:-ice SOl.il-'i S7" ~as: 9. 7 c'.12:..."'..S, 
=ore or less; thence Sout.."I 23°45' i. .. ~est: 5.4 cita.i"-5; t:'1e..-i::2 Sout..": 68a 
East 24.50 chains, rrore or less, to the uj_ddle of \.·irgiD ?-i"er, to 
a i:ioint, \~hlc~ is lli c~c.ir.s ':·:est and 15 ch2ir.s Sou:':-i ~G· the ~cr-c;1e.=..:;: 
evrner of t..'ie Sout.."-r,~est .': Sec:icn 25, ::-ie~ce fol-::.c.- C.C-.--:-i.s'-.ro:::~, tr.e 
middle of t..li.e River to ti'-1e f-Oint of begi_-._--,_ing ;._:_so Be~L-i.n.i.ig 2t 
a point 10 Oi.ains Sout".: of c.:-,e :-lor':;-.,.,;.::s: corr.er oI t..'-.e Sou:..'-_:~-est Z. 
Sou':..:-,,.;est a:'-12....cer Section 25, Ta.-.ns';:i? 41 Scuth, R2;e l3 • .. :est, S2lt 
Lal.::e Base and }fridi2..., .:;::rd r,_:r-~-S'P"\£ t...'-.e:ice East 30 c:-ia.i.......,s t.."-iEJice ~~O!'~--:erly 
30 c~.air.s, mre or less to :..'-ie poI:-it of intersec:ion of t:-,e ;;iiddle 
of t..1ie c.""s...-~el of the V:.rgin ?_::_..,:er wicil the lirie SC.?e:"a.'.:if'g We Sou::~. =s: 
;;; and Nortirwest 3:. of Section 25, then fol la-.' do.-."1":.Sl:Tc.E.-ri t..'ie rri.idC.le 
of the River to a point ._,-';-_,ere said river intersec:s t:-.e East2:-ly eo.._-,z: 
lir'e of :-lig_'--;..;ay e-17; thence South 21a ~·\·.'est l5 c-,c.i...ts, TJC·t"2 or 
less to fr1e South bounda.rf line of :for:'.le2st Z Svu:.'-.ee.sc ~ Sec:ion 26, 
thence East 19 chains, rrore or less to t..'ie Sout·~.e?..s': corner of t.'-ie 
Northeas~ le Southeast 3::; thence South 10 chains to begin.n.i.tg. 
"W..,.1T:-.:Ess the h.rnd of s•id- gr:.rncor , dUs 
1
).th 
/1 
C,iy :i 
Harc::-t , A. D. one chous.rnd rune ~l)r;dred :and se·;_~:0Y.. SE:':e'!"\ !'.;: 1 
Sign~d in che pre.::.ence of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County oi I RON l ,,_ J 
/"!/;~-:s.,::~-1" ,?/'"1 ~/".·c/_/-_, 
/ '-<" f Q '~ );/'*"; ...... -~~~-- ""----
____ ) .. [_ .!-::---~ -~~r.-'.C."~~-
-- -~~.:' . .:;,~.~ -~-.. -
, ;:,(,c-. _ c-~c?i:>~> 
On the 5th day of ~!a!'ch 
rhous;;.nd njn~ hundred ;i,nd seventy seven persom!ly aprc:srcd before ?".e J 
Gene•Jieve A. Smith, Jesse Sr7lith, Beth Sr1ith, Salli S~.-:~!, 
}, Dor.' 
Penn H. Sm1 th and t·1a::-y A. Smith -, ,, ·' ·-' - , :~:;igrer of ,he for<going irutrument, "ho dulr ockno•l,dg, to me th•(/;j{~,:~t';~ 
1 
~ c.'~cc•ri._!' · I 
~1y comrrus.sion e.i:pir~s 1-12- 81 
Addre.ss Cec;r-1~.t '·}t~,O, ;: ,, , ;, 
ATTACHMEITT "A" 
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ALLEN, THOMPSON & HUGHES 
Michael D. Hughes 
Attorney at Law 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Appellants 
and Cross Respondents 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENEVIEVE A. SMITH, JESSE E. SMITH, 
BETH M. SMITH, and SALLI SMITH GIRARD, 
vs. 
Involuntary Defendants, 
"Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross Appellant, 
CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHERINE R. 
APPLEBY, DON BJARNSON, and GRACE 
BJARNSON, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross Respondents. 
NEWLY 
DISCOVERED 
CASE 
Case No. 17662 
PURSUANT to Rule 75(p) (3) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Appellants by and through their counsel 
augment Point 3 of their Brief on Appeal by citing Interiors 
Contracting Incorporated, et al v. Navalco, No 17105, Filed 
June 10, 1982, approximately eighty days after the filing of 
Appellant's Reply Brief. Appellants cite Navalco for the 
proposition that "(o)rderly procedure requires that a party 
present all his evidence on the issues once he embarks upon 
the proof of his case" and that "(f)ailure to adduce 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence on a claim at issue constitutes a waiver of the 
claim." Thus, Navalco supports Appellants' position that 
the Respondent, once having rested at trial without 
presenting evidence on attorney's fees and having failed to 
move to reopen the trial even after Appellants rested had 
voluntarily forgone her right to introduce fresh evidence, 
and had waived recovery on that issue. See Appellant's 
Brief at Page 30. The Navalco case further points out that 
the lower Court's sua sponte reopening of the case three 
weeks after trial without motion was both capricious and 
arbitrary, and certainly thwarts the basic system of Utah 
justice, in which adversaries must take the responsibility 
for their own trial strategies. 
That the lower Court awarded attorney's fees which 
Respondent waived for her proving a breach which Respondent 
also waived by accepting rent compounds the absurdity of 
this case. 
1982. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of October, 
'71~~4/IJ-#~,?-
MICHAEL D. HUGHES 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Appellants and Cross Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the day of 
October, 1982, I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing NEWLY DISCOVERED CASE to John L. Miles 
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and J. MacArthur Wright of Atkin, Wright & Miles, attorneys 
for respondent and cross appellant, P. 0. Box 339, St. 
George, Utah 84770, postage prepaid. 
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